


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*Lt Gen ML Thapan PVSM
(Retd.)*

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Armies of India from the

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JANUARY-MARCH 1976

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
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
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NATION REGAINS SPIRIT OF ADVENTURE 1975-76

Production and Performance Improve

- ◆ Economy records a growth rate of 5.5 per cent against 0.2 per cent in 1974-75.
- ◆ Foodgrains production expected to reach 114 million tonnes.
- ◆ Industrial production increases to 4.5 per cent against 2.5 per cent in 1974-75.
- ◆ Total production of Public Sector units records an increase of nearly 36 per cent.
- ◆ Railways, Posts and Telegraphs record appreciable improvement in punctuality, promptness, courtesy and service to the public.



General TN RAINA, MVC, Chief of the Army Staff inaugurating the Third USI Seminar on Retiring Age in the Armed Forces—3 Dec 75

WEAPONS FROM OIL WEALTH AND INDIA'S SECURITY

MAJOR MR SURKUND

"There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate
upon permanent and real favours from nation to nation."

GEORGE WASHINGTON

INTRODUCTION

IN world of nuclear-power detente the last vestiges of Pax Britannica in the East were swept away in 1971. The British withdrawal was the final phase of the disintegration of a collapsed empire and the decline of a great power. With India no longer a node in the erstwhile British Empire there was no imperial rationale in maintaining a presence in the territories and waters of the vast strategic areas East of Suez. This power vacuum presented the world community with the challenge of a new arena of simmering and potential conflict. The oil rich countries of West Asia began a slow transition from a unifocal state system under the century-old patronage of the British to a system revolving around regional powers supported and manipulated in varying degree by outside interests.

Concurrently the increasing world demand for oil had acted as a catalyst in a tremendous transformation in respect of the world energy crisis, state-oil company relationships and quantum of profit. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) whose genesis in 1960 was an attempt to stabilise oil prices began spasmodic but inexorable jumps towards higher oil prices. Sellers in a buyer's market, their ukase on price levels had to be accepted, albeit grudgingly and at great risk of financial and budgetary chaos by oil-hungry nations. The Croesus-like wealth flowing into the area created super-rich states and new vistas for the rulers of the region. Reasoning for the most part that the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry was equivalent to upgrading their status they began refurbishing their arsenals. In an over-reaction to the energy crisis, and to ensure quick repatriation of petro-dollars Western countries began an unseemly scramble to conclude "arms for oil" deals to pander to this new taste. A feverish induction of arms began flowing into an area which had been militarily calm since World War II. Inevitably the balance of power began changing and affecting the strategic environment.

After the trauma of 1971, which in effect partitioned the sub-continent a second time, India had become the dominant political power in South

*Note :—This essay was awarded Cash prize for the best entry for Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for "A" (1974)

Asia. This drastic re-ordering of the pattern of power clearly established India's predominance and gave it reason to assert reasonable claims to a greater role in world affairs. This new pattern, this nascent role, is vitally affected by the acquisition of arms by oil rich nations. The impact of this has to be taken by a combination of political, military and economic means if our national interests have to be secured and guaranteed.

This subject will be discussed under the following heads :—

- (a) Background of the rise in oil prices.
- (b) The oil-rich nations and their arms purchases.
- (c) Power interaction in the area.
- (d) The impact on India.
- (e) Measures to be adopted by India.

THE RISE IN OIL PRICES

The current decade began with an increasing demand for oil. Futuristic projections indicated that this demand would rise much further in the Eighties. The OPEC members realised that they were fast depleting their oil reserves without providing any adequate and alternate means for a future economic contingency. This started the slow process of assertion against international oil consortiums with regard to nationalisation and participation in the direction of oil companies. National oil companies came into being. By 1967, OPEC obtained a freeze on profits by foreign companies and later, an appreciable rise in royalties. Within 10 years of the formation of OPEC the relative powers of oil companies and governments had reversed and the OPEC members had become a force to be reckoned with. In 1970, the US had produced 25% of the world's oil and the USSR 15% but the importance of West Asian oil in world trade was much greater, accounting for 50% of total exports.¹ In 1971, OPEC members were able to force oil companies to increase not only tax reference prices but to agree to further and periodic rises to counter inflation. By 1972, the oil-rich countries of the Gulf were producing 18 million barrels or nearly 34% of the world's oil. *Time* magazine estimated that their proven reserves were of the order of 312 billion barrels against world reserves of 482 billion barrels or nearly 64.7%.²

Reasons for the rise in oil prices. In Oct '73 and again in Dec '73 oil prices were increased raising the oil revenue to almost £ 7 a barrel.³ OPEC members have now decided that (with effect from 1 Jan 1975) they will do away with the arcane set-up of three different prices viz. the "posted", the "equity" and the "buy-back". The new one price system will be \$ 10.12 per barrel of Arabian light crude ex Ras Tanura.⁴ The price rise can be attri-

¹The Middle East-Edited by Peter Mansfield.

²Time 4 Nov., 1974.

³Hindustan Times 25 Dec., 1973.

⁴Time 23 Dec., 1974.

buted to the following reasons:—

- (a) As stated earlier, OPEC members felt their oil reserves were depleting before a viable alternate economy could be created.
- (b) In the past, oil had been sold at low prices to industrial countries who accelerated their economy by using cheap oil. These countries also derived immense profit on finished oil products and sold capital goods and services at exorbitant costs to oil-producing countries.
- (c) Serious doubts arose regarding the guaranteed stability of the dollar and pound. Constant devaluations reduced accumulated foreign exchange reserves.

OIL AND REVENUE

Government Oil Revenues. In 1966 the total revenue of OPEC members amounted to \$ 4500 million. The figure has now been estimated to be over \$ 15000 million whilst a forecast by Hansen Joachim speaks of \$ 56000 million by the 1980's.⁵ International Monetary Fund Figures reveal that by 30 Sep '74, OPEC members had piled up more than \$ 38 billion of monetary reserves or an awesome 19% of the world's total.⁶

Effect of price rise on Revenue. The monetary reserves of the Middle East by the end of the decade are expected to top the \$ 280 billion mark or more than two thirds of the world's monetary reserves.⁷ Akins gives a projection⁸ for the remainder of the decade but the figures for revenue appearing againzt 1980 appear to be under-estimated. His figures are :—

Country	1975		1980	
	Production*	Revenue‡	Production*	Revenue‡
(a) Iran	7300	4.7	10000	12.8
(b) Saudi Arabia	8500	5.4	20000	25.6
(c) Kuwait	3500	2.2	4000	5.0
(d) Iraq	1900	1.2	5000	6.4
(e) Abu Dhabi	2300	1.5	4000	5.0
(f) Other Gulf States	1800	1.0	2000	3.2
(g) Libya	2200	2.0	2000	3.1

*In 1000 barrels per day.

‡In \$ billion per day.

⁵A new era of International Oil Economy H Joachim Aussen Politik No. 2/73.

⁶Time 18 Nov. 74.

⁷Oil politics in the Western Gulf MAS Khan.

⁸The oil crisis : This time the wolf is here JS Akins Foreign Affairs Apr. 73.

THE OIL RICH NATIONS AND THEIR ARMS PURCHASES

Before going into the ramifications of the purchase of arms it would be worthwhile to examine the world armament market and then carry out an encapsulated study of the oil rich countries and their foreign policies. For obvious reasons this will be restricted to countries in the Gulf area.

The World Armament Market. Currently the US produces 40 % of the world's armament of which nearly three quarters go to NATO allies and the balance to pro-West governments in West Asia, Latin America and Africa. The USSR and its allies produce some 30 %. A late entrant in the field of arms sales, beginning in 1955, their major customers are Egypt and other West Asian countries, Africa and India. By 1971 Soviet arms sales to "third-world" countries was in excess of \$ 640 million. In third place come France and the United Kingdom, who are far down the ladder, followed by Italy, Sweden and Switzerland.

Low population and undeveloped economies in most oil rich countries severely limit the type, quantity and range of consumer and capital goods which can be marketed there. In contrast arms sales are easier, and needless to say, sophisticated weaponry is extremely expensive. An assessment of the arms purchase shows that the weapons are varied and this inevitably forces large inventory holdings. Lacking any kind of infrastructure, the purchaser has to depend on the supplier for training, spares and maintenance. It is pertinent to note that none of the oil rich nations have yet set up production or even maintenance facilities.

IRAN

Iran occupies 628,000 sq. miles in the Western half of the Iranian plateau and has a population of 32 million people. She is bigger in population than all the other Gulf states put together. Oil revenues accounted for 68 % and 75 % of her budget in 1960 and 1968 respectively. Comprehending that his monarchy would survive only if urgent socio-economic measures were taken, the Shah launched a "White revolution". In Nov. 73 her largest ever budget of \$ 16000 million was introduced including \$ 3200 million for defence.⁹ Today Iran is the largest customer for US arms, buying aircraft faster than they come off the assembly line. She is the first foreign country to add F 4 Phantoms, F 5 fighters and Grumman F 14 Tomcats to her arsenal.¹⁰ She is also alleged to be interested in buying West German Leopard tanks.¹¹ A number of her defence personnel are being trained at US bases.¹² Additional details of arms purchases by her are shown in the appendix A at page 20. By 1975, Iran will have twice as many helicopters and aircraft and quadruple the size of her Navy. Operating from bases under

⁹Hindustan Times 29 Nov. 73.

¹⁰Indian Express 17 Nov. 73, Statesman 12 Jan. 74.

¹¹Statesman 22 Jan. 74.

¹²Times of India 30 Jan. 74.

construction at Chabahar and Bandar Abbas, the Iranian Navy could guard the entrance to the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz; granted ocean-going capability her Navy could be the biggest maritime power in the area. Her Air Force with in flight-refuelling could strike at places far away from her borders.

Foreign policy. There is little doubt that Iran wants to be the dominant power in West Asia with the intention of assuring stability in the Gulf. At a press conference in Washington on 25 Jul 73 the Shah made no secret of becoming "in ten years' time what France, Germany and the UK are today". The Shah is also anticipating a weakening of US potential in the area following the loss of the US base at Bahrain and the transit facilities which may be or have been given to the Soviet Navy by various countries. Iran's ambitions have perhaps aroused some apprehensions in some of the Arab states in the area.

Relationships with India. In the period immediately following the Indo-Pak war of 1971, there appeared to be a misunderstanding of India in Iranian foreign policy, enhanced by the Shah's pronouncement that he would not sit idle in the event of a further disintegration of Pakistan. This was undeniable, for the security interests of Iran demanded a stable Pakistan *vis-a-vis* portents of further dismemberment, be it following a Pak-Afghan war or a Baluchi revolt. Iran's military relationships with Pakistan have included joint exercises in the Gulf such as the CENTO Maritime Exercise MID-LINK in Dec 73. However, Iran has a fairly secular outlook and in an attempt to carve out a separate identity from her Arab neighbours she has been emphasizing her pre-Muslim Aryan heritage. For this reason Pakistan's cries of "Jehad" are unlikely to get much credence in Teheran. In his public pronouncements, the Shah appears to be a well-wisher for peace on the Indian sub-continent, and veering towards a less pro-Pakistani stance. Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi's visit to Teheran, the Shah's visit to India in late 74 and the formation of the Indo-Iranian Joint Commission for Economic and Technical Cooperation have been India's diplomatic steps in the right direction. There has also been a great spurt in economic and commercial cooperation. With this it appears that the possibility of hostility between the two countries, either directly or by proxy, has been reduced considerably, and that Iran is unlikely to encourage Pakistan's diminishing but alive revanchism. Iran also wishes to play a leading part in developing regional cooperation and in strengthening the socio-economic pace of its own already rapid progress which in turn will strengthen its independent foreign policy initiatives.

SAUDI ARABIA

This country occupies 90% of the entire Arabian peninsula and has a population of about 8.5 million. Her oil revenues, often splurged on excessive royal expenditure during the Ibu Saud era, have given her the means for a rapid socio-economic transformation. She still has to face obstacles

in this task, in the shape of an excessively centralised administration, the imperatives of religious attitudinising and the absence of skilled manpower. Her acquisition of military hardware is shown in appendix 'A' attached page 20.

Foreign Policy. Saudi Arabia follows an extremely pro-West and anti-communist policy. After 1967, Saudi foreign policy has followed a comparatively inactive line, maintaining correct but frigid relationships with the socialist Arab states. Saudi Arabia also perhaps mistrusts Iranian ambitions. King Feisal's record of rule showed a predominantly pro-West but carefully thought out pattern. As a government, Saudi Arabia has usually been pro-Pakistan and successor regimes have continued this policy, but there could be gradual changes because of internal social change.

IRAQ

This country with an area of 1,75,000 sq miles and a population of 10 million is Iran's rival in the area with strong views on the Arabism of the Gulf. After the fall of the monarchy in 1958 her political situation was unpredictable, but after 1968 there has been greater stability. In 1970 her relations with Iran were very strained over a rightist coup attempted by alleged Iranian—US support. There were also problems with the Kurds and a dispute with Iran over the Shatt—Al—Arab. She had also alleged that Iran is assisting the dissident movement amongst Iraqi Kurds and Shias. Since the Iran-Iraq agreement of March 1975 she has stabilised her relationships with Iran. Iraq also has territorial disputes with Kuwait on account of latent claims to that area.

Foreign Policy. Iraq has signed a treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation with the USSR and maintains a pro-Soviet and socialist revolutionary stance in international affairs. Very few details are available about her arms deals as these principally involve sales by Warsaw Pact countries. India has very cordial relations with Iraq as also close economic ties.

KUWAIT

Kuwait is an Emirate of some 7400 sq miles with a population of about one million set in the NW corner of the Gulf around the Bay of Kuwait. A founder member of the CAPEC in 1969, she has the distinction of having the highest per capita GNP in the world. Oil constitutes 95% of her revenue and a substantial proportion of these funds have been used to transform this city state. She has launched programmes embracing extremely wide-ranging welfare, social service and public utility measures. She took a leading part along with Saudia Arabia in the federation of the erstwhile Trucial States. In view of her economic abundance she has been a magnet for expatriate skills and a 1965 survey revealed that some 77% of her population were non-Kuwaitis. Kuwait has very friendly relations with Pakistan. Because of her strained relations with Iraq she is determined to build up her armed forces.

Arms purchases. Currently, Kuwait has a low military profile with a total of 10,000 men in uniform of whom 80% are in the Army and almost 20% in the Airforce. She has no Navy to speak of. In the past year she has been hesitating whether to purchase arms from the US or France. The details of her arms purchases are as under :

- (a) She has a secret agreement with the French to buy 36 Mirage V single seat Ground Attack fighters and helicopters worth \$ 85 millions as quoted by the newspaper Al Rai Al Aam.¹³ These aircraft were to be delivered in 1974. She is also contemplating the purchase of other French weapons.
- (b) Kuwait has decided to buy French Mirages and Anglo-French Jaguars instead of the US Northrop F5E and LTVA-7 planes offered by the US.¹⁴
- (c) She is purchasing 48 US Raytheon-Hawk missiles at a cost of \$90 millions and French SS 11 Harpon missiles worth \$8 millions.¹⁵

OTHER GULF STATES

Bahrain. Bahrain consists of a small group of low lying islands located some 20 miles off shore from Saudi Arabia, with a population of 233,000. During the period 1968-71 she took part in the negotiations for a federation of Gulf states but finally opted for independence. A long standing problem of security created by Iranian claims to Bahrain was settled after a UN report verdict in Mar 1970 was accepted by Iran. At the end of 1973, Bahrain asked the US to withdraw forces from her soil within a period of one year.¹⁶ Bahrain maintains a very small Army of 1,100 men and apart from some police patrol launches and helicopters has no Navy or Air Force.

Oman. This occupies 82,000 sq miles in SE Arabia and has a population of 710,000. Trucial Oman, separated from the main Sultanate, occupies the Ras Musandam peninsula, the remainder extending for some 200 miles along the coast to the borders of S Yemen. Her economy was radically transformed by the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 1967. The present King Qabus came to power in 1970 after a palace revolution against his father. She faces the problem of the radical Dhufar Liberation Front (PFLOAG) which absorbs 50% of her oil revenue. She is buying 2 Skyvan light transport and 3 BAC-111-475 twin jet transport aircraft from the UK.¹⁵ Her armed forces are 9000 men with an additional 600 expatriates on contract or secondment.

Qatar. This country has an area of 4000 sq miles and a population of about 100,000, more than half of whom are foreigners. She has un-demarcated land frontiers with Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, and has border disputes with the latter. She has an armed force level of 2200 men.

¹³Times of India 26 Nov., 73.

¹⁴Hindustan Times 24 Mar., 73.

¹⁵Financial Times 25 Apr., 74.

¹⁶Times of India 11 Nov., 73.

The United Arab Emirates. (UAE) These consist of seven sovereign states viz Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujaira, Ras al-Khaima, Sharja and Umm al-Qaiwin. They lie on the Southern shores of the Gulf extending eastwards to the Gulf of Oman. Each Ruler exercises absolute power through traditional institutions. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaik Al-Nahyan, is also the President of the UAE. The most important Emirates are:—

- (a) *Abu Dhabi.* With a population of 50,000, this Emirate had a per capita oil revenue of approximately \$ 4600 in 1970. Despite this she went through a severe budgetary crisis in that year due to a high level of expenditure on defence and development. She has extremely good relations with Pakistan and has signed a protocol aimed at setting up a refinery in Multan and a 300 mile pipeline linking it to Karachi. She maintains an 8000 strong armed force officered by British, Jordanian and Pakistani nationals. Her armament purchases include:—
 - (i) Acquisition of 32 Mirages (18 Mirage III interceptors by 1976 and 14 Mirage V Ground Attack aircraft in 74—75) at a cost of \$ 90 Million.¹⁷
 - (ii) French SS 11 Harpon missiles worth \$ 8 million.¹⁸
 - (iii) The Military Balance 1973—74 figures include 10 coastal patrol boats (one of 110 tons) to have been delivered in 1972-73.
- (b) *Dubai.* This Emirate under Sheikh Rashid who is Vice President of the UNE is a compact territory which is almost entirely sand desert. Oil revenues in 1973 were \$ 46 million. Her mainstays are oil and the dhow trade.

Relations between UNE and India are good particularly after the visits to India by both Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashid in early 1975.

POWER INTERACTION IN THE AREA

REGIONAL POWER PROBLEMS

The justification for large scale arms purchases can be reduced to a few main points, which are :—

- (a) The need for the states of this region to deal with possible domestic uprisings particularly in those states which have autocratic monarchies and oligarchies in power. With inevitably larger amounts being spent on education and modernisation, political consciousness is growing in the area with socialistic overtones.

¹⁷Dawan 24 Nov. 73.

¹⁸Statesman 5 Jan. 74.

This is accentuated by pressures from the socialist Arab countries. It must be realised that 80% of Arab oil revenues accrue to Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and Libya which can muster just 10% of the Arab population. Small wonder that arms purchases constitute a form of insurance against have not Arab brethren !

- (b) Action against internal elements and organisations and separatist movements who may under external investigation or because of opposition to the regime or disagreement on policies towards Israel, threaten oil installations.
- (c) Put down regional conflicts and border squabbles.
- (d) Minimise big power intervention, or even, in a farfetched but now regularly mentioned situation, an attack by an oil hungry nation on them.
- (e) Last but not the least, as a status symbol.

In the struggle for political control, we can perceive four distinct forces interacting. These are:—

- (a) Local nationalism which wishes to establish, protect and develop the sovereign independence of each state.
- (b) Arab nationalism which often inspires political discontentment in absolutist regimes.
- (c) Russian and latterly Chinese communism wishing to achieve their long-term stated aims.
- (d) Anglo-American imperialism.

Left to themselves, the future pattern of the Gulf may lead to one of the following :—

- (a) Left-oriented local movements capturing power in the weaker states as happened in S. Yemen.
- (b) Prolonged hostility between republican and monarchist forces as in Yemen.
- (c) Larger states using force to assert their claims as happened when Iran took over Abu Musa and the two Tumb islands in the Gulf.

GREAT POWER INTERACTION

The nature and extent of great power interest in this region make it an area of special concern. The two major factors which excite interest are the area's geographical location and ofcourse oil. A factor which is worth re-emphasis is that the great powers are anxious to safeguard oil interests and repatriate petrodollars by selling arms. Though one school of thought welcomes great power interaction as a stabilising influence particularly in the context of detente this may not be the case. Detente on a global scale has hardly precluded local jockeying for position as in the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.

US Interests. Any future "imperial" role by the US is unlikely as past actions have proved intolerably expensive and largely counter-productive. Her post-Vietnam policies would therefore call for a period of "recuperation" and a posture where she could be part of the power system with the USSR and China at the other foci of the system. The US backs Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. With the dismemberment of Pakistan US policies may have veered towards utilising Pakistan in combination with other West Asian countries. The US would perhaps like to check both Soviet and Indian influence or activity in either the Gulf or the Indian Ocean. In addition, she would aim at keeping Iran and Saudi Arabia on good terms with each other.¹⁹ It appears the US would like to see Iran as the dominant naval power in the Gulf and by implication the major military power with Saudi Arabia as the dominant military power on the Arabian Peninsula. The interaction in this area can also be seen in broader perspective as an extension of the US-Soviet rivalry in other parts of the world. In essence, the US would like to narrow Moscow's scope without over-reacting to the point of provoking a deeper Soviet involvement.

Pakistan's Role. The place of Pakistan in the US conception of Gulf strategy merits consideration. Let us not forget that US arms aid to Pakistan in the last decade gave the latter sophisticated arms free, which contributed substantially to Pakistan's illusions of military grandeur. It is felt that the US plan is to form a strong security "*cordon sanitaire*" around the Pakistan-Iran-Saudi Arabia-Jordan group of states whose importance to US aspirations was delineated in Olaf Caroe's book "*The Wells of Power*". If this area be propped up it would be an effective counterpoise to a possible Soviet-Iraqi-Afghan axis. Any Iran-Pakistan links would suit the US extremely well and Pakistan's pronouncements like those of May 73 stating "Collaboration with Iran is essential to Pakistan's strategy" must have been greeted happily in the US. In this light Iran's bases at Chah Bahar acquire a new significance to the point where *Vikrant* magazine (in Mar 73) claimed that these would enable protection against Indian naval attacks on Karachi on the Dec 71 model. However, the situation is quite fluid and cannot be divorced from the changing political relations in the region and particularly the trend of better relations of Iran with both India and the Arab countries.

Soviet Interests. In the last two decades, Soviet interests have come a long way. The Arabs are now being wooed, influenced, armed, and aided in many ways that suggest a long range desire to maintain a viable presence in the region. They have gained considerable influence on what may be termed "the Southern tier" of the Middle East. They are expanding their naval presence to match their age-old aspirations by a greater number, kind and frequency of ships in the area using air and port facilities in Iraq, Yemen and Somalia. The extension of Soviet access to the key water-ways extend-

ing from the Straits of Malacca to the Cape of Good Hope is a position of enormous strategic significance. Apart from being designed to fill areas of British Vacuum these moves could also be construed as a counter weight in areas where the US has positioned its missile firing submarines. Soviet Union has not, however, resolved its bad relations with Egypt or its consequences in the Gulf where Egypt, Saudi Arabia and some Gulf states are under Soviet influence.

Chinese Involvement. The years after 1970 saw a resurgence of Chinese diplomatic activity in this region. This was obviously carried out in view of Chinese fears of a Soviet maritime are from Suez-Vladivostok encircling China. In addition, the "thaw" with the US, the desire to get an economic foothold in the area, and Chinese plans to keep the West Asian cauldron simmering must have been powerful motivation. Chinese moves included;

- (a) Aid to go to Yemen for road building.
- (b) Training and equipping left wing nationalists and PFLOAG members before 1972.
- (c) Establishment of diplomatic relations with Kuwait in Mar 71 and visit by the Chinese Foreign Trade Minister in May 72.
- (d) Exchange of delegations with Iraq in Dec 71.
- (e) Establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran in Aug 72, and the visit by the Chinese Foreign Minister in June 73. During the visit, Iranian Military build-up was lauded as being "essential, necessary and desirable". It was also made clear that the Chinese would no longer support left-wing guerrilla movements. China has also become a fairly important oil exporting country.

French and British interests. Apart from a desire to cash in on the proliferating military trade and protect their industrial futures with guaranteed supplies of oil, it is difficult to perceive any other interests of these nations at work. The enormous and non-absorbable revenues of the oil rich countries are a magnet for agreements on economic, technical and military development. The French also wish to maintain a special relationship with the Arab world stretching from Algeria to Abu Dhabi. The political motivation for the French to conclude bilateral agreements with the Arabs is the frank and even brutal distrust of the US-Soviet detente and their self-imposed super power mantle of being the sole arbitrators of Arab-Israeli problems. The French foreign minister M Joubert declared in the French National Assembly that "the consequences of this veritable condominium is to incapacitate the international community, to treat Europe as a non-person, to humiliate it in its existence and to victimise it in view of its energy dependence".²⁰ Bilateral agreements by French and British governments have not found favour with the US since such a move has the following results :—

²⁰Hindustan Times 16 Jan., 74.

- (a) It reduces the chances of a united front against the CAPEC by diminishing their collective bargaining power.
- (b) It reduces the Arab dependence on US arms. In fact the Pentagon is believed to have asked the US to modify the conditions for third party sales since US arms cannot, in theory, be used against Israel.
- (c) It creates the bogey of Arab nations assisting Israel's neighbours to achieve a military settlement.

THE IMPACT ON INDIA

INDIA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS

From times immemorial, states have relied on military forces to further their interests and enhance their security. Whilst this is unquestionable, the sudden and massive inflow of arms into an area cannot but tilt the balance of power. As a result of the pre-occupation of the super powers with their own interests, they frequently betray an insensitive and manipulatory attitude towards smaller countries. It is no coincidence that since the Second World War all wars have been fought in the poorer portions of the globe with weapons provided by the rich. It has also been an axiom of strategic perspectives that the presence of military forces is a strong incentive to find a justification for their use. Again, whereas the policies and intentions of a country can change with dramatic speed, military capabilities normally alter slowly. In this light the changes in the West Asian strategic environment are of great significance and particularly so in view of the prevailing inter-state tensions in the area. At a time when we are striving for economic and social betterment of the nation the prospect of a conflagration in this "power keg" area is horrifying, to say the least. Indian strategic interests, in the shifting sands of West Asian politics, must indubitably have within their framework, the following facets :—

- (a) Freedom of navigation in international waterways. The importance of the Indian Ocean trade routes and of the Suez Canal, on our sea borne trade hardly need any emphasis.
- (b) There must be no super-power intervention in the area, nor any attempts by them to fill the vacuum left by the British.
- (c) The security of the Gulf should be the responsibility of the littoral states without any one country or group of countries achieving pre-dominance.

The ideal would therefore be an all encompassing security system created by the Gulf states themselves. However such an ideal is Utopian and unworkable because of the number of inter-state disputes, their vastly different patterns of government, their variations in size and strength, their differing opinions on the future of Israel and many other deep-rooted cultural, political and ideological antagonisms.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

Foreign Policy. One of the mainstays of Indian foreign policy has been a undeviating pro-Arab stance. A consistently pro-Arab posture has been and presumably will continue to be the major theme of our policy in this region. Despite the fact that in Indo-Pak wars we did not have the support of all West Asian nations, we have followed a principled policy of supporting Arab causes. Apart from traditional links we have close economic ties with Iran and the Eastern Arab world. Hence no major shift in policy, like the Japanese *volte-face* appears necessary.

Economic burden. The crushing burden imposed on our developing economy by the rise in oil prices is hardly worthy of repetition. It is no secret that our foreign exchange reserves, slim as they are, will just about serve to buy our oil requirements in the next decade. One assessment is that India in 1974 spent \$ 1.3 billion (approximately 2/3 of its foreign currency earnings) to import oil compared with \$ 265 million in 1973.²¹ India's Deputy Commerce Minister had said that about 80% of our export earnings are likely to be consumed by oil imports in the next few years.²² Again, Mr D.K. Barooah, then Union Minister for Petroleum and Chemicals had said that our bill for imported crude would be to the tune of Rs. 500—600 crores in foreign exchange or three times as much in 1972-73, and that next year's (1975) expenditure might be about 1200-1300 crores.²³ The impact of oil prices on our transportation, petro-chemical, fertilizer and other industries was felt in the concomitant relentless rise in the cost of living. With the crushing cost of crude oil there would be little scope for the diversion of funds to developmental expenditure. The adverse balance of trade payments that are ensuing would vitiate any attempts to achieve progress in fields like health, education and social welfare. These problems have however given a salutary push to our efforts towards energy, self-sufficiency and to increasing our exports.

Nor is any hope possible of oil prices receding. In the international oil market India plays no part in price fixation. In contrast, countries like Japan and the US can afford to pay higher prices even if such prices are ruinously outside our reach. As stated earlier big arms deals are fast ways of repatriating petro-dollars as increased oil bills can be matched by arms sales. For this reason it is felt that gigantic arms deals reduce the probability of oil prices ever reducing.²⁴

Military Implications. From what has been said earlier regarding the foreign policy of the oil-rich countries it is apparent that no direct threat to our security from those countries can be discerned since there are no direct clashes of interest involved. However there are major implications in

²¹Time 14 Oct. 74.

²²Hindustan Standard 15 Jan. 74.

²³Tribune 20 Jan. 74.

²⁴The growing importance of oil—John Berry, Military Review Oct. 72.

the event of these nations intervening indirectly in any future Indo-Pak conflict. Prime Minister Bhutto has publicly announced his intention of converting the Pakistan Army into "the finest war machine in Asia". He has also confirmed that he is seeking military assistance and that contacts with several Gulf states were taking place in view of the "alarming arms disparity" on the continent.²⁵ Though truncated, Pakistan is today a more compact country with no fears, as in the past, of fighting in two widely separated theatres.

It must however be stated that for the purposes of this Essay, the scenario of a joint Chinese-Pakistani attack supported by a West Asian country has not been considered as in that event India is unlikely to fight alone. The possibility of all the oil rich countries simultaneously "ganging up" on us at Pakistan's behest is also considered remote. What therefore impinges on any perception of threats to Indian security is an intransigent Pakistan attacking us with assistance from one or more of the oil rich. The forms and means this assistance may take are outlined in subsequent paragraphs.

Financial assistance. With the huge monetary reserves available to them, the oil-rich states may extend handsome credits to Pakistan. These could be used to purchase arms. The Saudi-Libyan assistance for the purchases of Atlantic-Breguet maritime reconnaissance aircraft is a case in point.²⁶ In a similar way, the newly created Islamic Development Bank may extend grants or soft loans to Pakistan which will enable her to divert her own foreign exchange reserves to purchase of arms abroad. Whilst this will enable purchase of the latest available arms, it must be remembered that there is a very long lead time inherent in the acquisition of modern equipment.

Disposal of obsolescent arms. With the acquisition of new and sophisticated hardware, countries friendly to Pakistan may gift or transfer their obsolescent arms. However there appear to be certain constraints in making military aid in kind available on a generous scale. For one thing, most arms presently held are of US or British origin and dated back to World War II stocks. The supply contracts prohibit transfer to third party countries though this clause can be breached very easily, as has been done in the past. It is also doubtful whether Pakistan would be keen on these antiquated armaments when sophisticated hardware is available. Also the present quantum of arms held is not extensive except in the case of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and these countries are unlikely to indulge in large scale transfers.

Building up of Indigenous Resources. A factor of great importance to India's security planners would be any proposed link up between French expertise and Arab oil money involving Pakistan. It is known that following

²⁵Economic Times 18 Dec., 74.

²⁶Vikrant Defence News Service 22 Dec., 74.

Australian criticism of French nuclear tests in the South Pacific, the French are reconsidering the need for a substitute for the Australian market.²⁷ French plans may well include the conversion of Pakistan into a strategic staging point and a major centre for the production, marketing and maintenance of their equipment. This could involve the production, under licence, of French arms. Though latest reports indicate that French plans to build up Pakistan's arms manufacture are limited, such an arrangement would have the following advantages and implications:—

- (a) Pakistan's geographical proximity and her affinities of common faith and culture with the Gulf states would make her an agreeable trading partner.
- (b) Any such deals could be clinched by the number of Pakistani instructors, pilots and other Pakistani instructors, pilots and other personnel already serving in these countries. These personnel could be used to train future Arab users of French equipment since French instructors, who may have pro-Israeli sympathies, may not be suitable.
- (c) Such a move may not alienate the US, whose plans for Pakistan in the area will be enhanced.
- (d) Pakistan already holds a variety of French equipment. These include Daphne submarines, Mirage aircraft, Allouette helicopters and other equipment.
- (e) This would enable Pakistan to hold, at any given time, extensive equipment under shipment or undergoing repairs which could be used by her in a future conflict.
- (f) Pakistan will be able to reduce her dependence on foreign arms. Sales of these arms would also bring in foreign exchange.

Pakistan-Gulf States links. In addition to what has been stated another very real danger may be covert military links between Pakistan and the Gulf states. The possibility of providing troops to Pakistan is being discounted as this would amount to overt belligerence, which is unlikely. The help that the Gulf states may render would include :—

- (a) Pakistan placing troops in those states who are provisioned, armed, equipped and paid for by Gulf states with arrangements to airlift them back should an emergency develop.²⁸ Such an arrangement would earn valuable foreign exchange and create a supernumerary military force capable of using high performance weaponry. This would also permit Pakistan to claim that she has reduced her military expenditure. It is pertinent to note that in recent years her defence appropriations as a percentage of revenue have varied from 39—50 %.

²⁷Statesman 5 Jan., 74.

²⁸Indian Express 14 Dec., 74.

- (b) Gulf states may permit Pakistan to keep in location aircraft of their countries. Since these would in any case be flown and maintained by the Pakistanis there would be a readily available force "in being"²⁹.

MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED BY INDIA

National security involves a pragmatic mix of foreign policy and defence planning based on a foundation of economic prosperity. There is no single or definitive answer to the problems of the changes in the strategic environment created by the acquisition of arms by oil rich nations. The measures both long and short terms to be adopted by India must indubitably include a variety of diplomatic, economic and military measures which are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

Foreign Policy.

- (a) We must continue to strengthen our diplomatic ties in the Gulf region. For too long our diplomatic efforts have centred around Washington, London and Moscow and it is now time to give this region the importance it deserves. The moves to continue our friendship with Iran, the visit of the UAE President in Jan '75 and the proposed Indo-UAE Joint Commission are steps in the right direction, but these ties must not be only at a Ministerial delegation level but must extend downwards to the "grass roots" level by commercial and other attaches and entrepreneurs.
- (b) We must project the image of our secular state, and the fact that we have the second largest number of Mulsims in the world. Pakistan has got away in the past by casting all our areas of friction in the mould of a Hindu-Muslim confrontation with her as the champion of Islamic ideals. She has never been chary of exploiting religion, Muslim brotherhood and Islamic solidarity. Whilst the oil-rich nations could continue to be vociferous about Islamic solidarity they would not respond to any Pakistani cries of "*Jehad*" without counting the cost of ruptured relations with India.
- (c) We must attempt to establish our own identity and show that we are not a Soviet client state or even a pawn in Soviet long term plans and that we do not have any hegemonistic designs. Any apprehensions arising out of our entry into the "Nuclear Club" must be alleviated.
- (d) We must convince Pakistan's probable allies that we have no intentions of dismembering her. This will prevent Pakistan from using this as a "casus belli" to drum up support.

²⁹Router quote from the French 'L' 'Aurore in Hindustan Times on 3 Jan., 74.

- (e) We must also shed the unfounded fear that Pakistan would have the backing of the entire oil rich world. The survey of these countries carried out earlier reveals that differences between oil producers, exacerbated by dormant conflicts over boundaries and traditional rivalries of sect and culture, preclude their acting in a "coherent, in phase" fashion.

Economic Measures and Foreign Trade. The oil producing countries have huge sterling and dollar deposits in Western banks some of which are controlled by interests inimical to Arab causes. On the other hand, since 1947 we have built up a good industrial infra-structure and have acquired considerable experience and expertise in economic advancement, but are short of capital. A happy marriage of these two factors would be an ideal solution. The new urge for diversifying oil-rich economies mated to our untapped potential would seem to provide an answer. We must convince the oil-rich nations that gains made *vis-a-vis* the developed nations can only be safeguarded in the frame-work of an overall improvement of the bargaining power and status of the third world. Measures to be taken in this field, many of which are already in the implementation stage, would include:—

- (a) Expansion of trade with oil-rich countries. These could include items like setting up plants abroad, loaning experts, consultancy services and the like. We must also seek to improve the export potential of non-traditional commodities.
- (b) Entering into economic collaboration in the field of nuclear technology, textile, petro-chemical, steel, ship-building and cement industries. Such agreements besides satisfying the interests of both parties would also limit actions inimical to an economic ally.
- (c) *Reduction of our dependence on imported oil.* Though this aspect could well form the basis of a separate study it is being mentioned in view of its relevance. Energy self-sufficiency can be achieved by:—
- (i) Entering into bilateral agreements on offshore drilling both in the Gulf and off our coasts.
 - (ii) Greater development of indigenous resources. In this connection the decision to treble ONGC's budget announced by AIR on 01 Jan 75 is heartening.
 - (iii) Curbing of domestic oil consumption by ensuring that future power plants burn only coal and other means of fuel economy.
 - (iv) Optimum use of available crude by greater use of appropriate secondary processes like hydro-cracking.

Defence. A very real danger exists of Pakistan going to war to regain her confidence. In this event, it would not be enough to trade a few bits of territory as in the past. What would be needed is an all out blow—a lightning

strike, not a protracted conflict—to prevent any support to Pakistan from gathering momentum. We should be able to make accurate estimates of the amount of “transferable” arms that Pakistan can use against us and train for this. Our equipment and force levels must be determined accordingly.

One school of thought has it that we should not rely on conventional arms but must develop a nuclear strike capability. Such a posture would be prohibitively expensive and it would be foolhardy to match hardware with the oil rich countries. We do not have the resources and such a pre-occupation would be suicidal. Other means must include the following:—

- (a) We must continue to improve the technological backing for our defence needs. This can perhaps best be done by concentrating on applied research to improve our equipment and achieve a viable defence industry. We have since 1947, developed a technological backing which as yet does not assure self-sufficiency but gives us the ability to sustain an operation till our aims are achieved. We are beyond the stage where an arms freeze can affect the outcome of the War. This process of defence development must be speeded up. In the ultimate analysis, there is no substitute for self-reliance.
- (b) The 1971 war clearly brought out the potential of maritime power and its role in the defence framework. However any naval ambitions that we have must avoid the possibility of confrontation with Iran.
- (c) In the past we have extended military training facilities and help to a number of friendly countries. We should continue this policy and extend it to the smaller countries in the Gulf.
- (d) We could also consider the export of defence equipment to include relatively unsophisticated items like small arms, vehicles and communication equipment.

CONCLUSION

The implications of the unfolding “oil for arms” situation on Indian interests extend far beyond the emergency of a new zone of US-Soviet rivalry. Against the pattern of an ever changing inter-state relationship in the area and the radical changes in the strategic and geo-political situation we have to superimpose the situations created by the enormous price of “black gold”. Pakistan’s failure to cope with the lessons of the 1971 war and her illogical determination not to play a secondary role have caused her to search for a new military identity, based on the advantages of Muslim ties with the oil rich nations. This dormant revanchism must form a focal point of Indian security considerations.

To counter the problems involved our foreign policy must aim at demolishing artificial barriers of religion and projecting our strong but friendly image. In the field of trade with the oil rich countries we must

offer avenues for lucrative investment, widen the scope of joint ventures and improve our export trade patterns in order to improve our trade balances. Our defence production plans must aim at autoarchy. We must reduce our dependence on imported oil. Military, the residual risk of limited arms transfers should be countered by maintaining a military superiority over Pakistan but not by entering into an economically ruinous one-upmanship with the oil rich. In the ultimate analysis we must realise that it is the nation's intrinsic strength that counts and not dependence on any foreign interests. These measures combined with our new stature on the sub-continent and our newly demonstrated nuclear prowess have given us the potential to overcome the problems created by the acquisition of weapons by oil rich nations. If Independence and our "tryst with destiny" are to have any meaning then this potential must be exploited.

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APPENDIX 'A'

DETAILS OF ARMS PURCHASES BY IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA

1. *Quantum of arms purchased by Iran.*

(a) The Military Balance 1973-74 gives the following figures:—

	<i>Qty</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Cost</i> (\$ million)	<i>Delivery</i>
(i)	—	Scorpion	Lt tks	
		Fox	AFVS	72 —
(ii)	46	AB-205A	heptrs	— —
(iii)	6	P-32 Orin	MR ac	— 1974
(iv)	111*	F-5E	fighters	— —
			*shipment to begin in 1974, cost of each aircraft \$ 1.7 million as per Statesman reports of 2 Feb. 74.	
(v)	287	Bell UH-IH 214A Huey plus	heptrs	63 1975-76
			(initial)	
(vi)	202	Bell AH IJ armed (Navy)	heptrs	38.5 -do-
			(initial)	
(vii)	70	*F4 Phantoms	FB	„ 1974
		(*in addition to 64 previously purchased)		
(viii)	6	Boeing 707-320	tpt/tanker	62.5 —
(ix)	20	Hercules C 30	tpt ac	— —

(b) *Other sources.*

- (i) 50 Grumman F14 Tomcats in addition to 38 on order.¹ The first of 24 to be delivered in 1976 at two per month and the balance in following years.² These aircraft are armed with six Phoenix missiles each. This deal will cost \$ 900 million. A portion of the Research and Development costs are also to be borne by Iran.
- (ii) 53 USAF F 15's at a cost of £ 1.1 million, initial deliveries in 1976-77¹.
- (iii) 6 French high speed gun boats firing Exocet missiles².

¹Indian Express 13 Nov., 73.²Hindustan Times 1 Feb., 74.

- (iv) 22 medium transport CH 4 FC Chinook helicopters made under license in Italy, an order worth more than \$ 100 million. In 1969 an order had been placed for 22 which is being fulfilled.³
- (v) Iran has also expressed a desire to buy two E34 planes fitted with the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) now under development by the Boeing company.³
- (vi) The signing of a \$ 50 million contract with the UK for radar equipment for Rapier anti-aircraft missiles.⁴

2. Arms purchases by Saudi Arabia

- (a) The Military Balance 1973-74 gives the following information:—

	<i>Qty</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Cost</i> (\$ million)	<i>Delivery</i>
(i)	10	BAC 167 COIN fighters	—	—
(ii)	—	Spares and repair services contract for Air force.	625	1973-78
(iii)	30	AMX 30 med tks	—	1972
(iv)	3	C 30 E tpt ac Hercules	—	—
(v)	90	F 5 fighters	230	—
(vi)	30	F B	—	—

(b) Other sources

- (i) A British-Saudi agreement under which Britain is to get 30 million tons of oil per year in exchange for an unspecified quantity of arms.⁵
- (ii) 38 Mirage III aircraft, bridging and amphibious equipment, 100 AMX tanks and light armoured cars, from France. The Saudis are also believed to be interested in Crotale anti-aircraft missiles and Exocet ship to ship missiles.⁶ This deal is to provide France with 800 million tons of oil over the next 20 years, which amounts to one-third of her annual consumption.
- (iii) 100 Mirage F1 aircraft from France.⁷
- (iv) A Times of India report from Washington quoting Jack Anderson as saying that the US is building guided missile gun boats, patrol ships and frigates for Saudi Arabia.⁸
- (v) France SS II Harpon missiles at a cost of \$ 18 million, and 3 or 5 batteries (of 48 US Raytheon-Hawk missiles each) at a cost of \$ 300 million.⁹

³Financial Times 25 Apr., 74.

⁴Hindustan Times 24 Jan., 74.

⁵Times of India 30 Dec., 73.

⁶The Times, London 8 Jan., 74.

⁷Hindustan Times 24 Jan., 74.

⁸Vikrant Defence Diary 25-31 Mar., 74.

⁹Financial Times 25 Apr. 74.

THE OUTLAY ON DEFENCE *

LIEUT GENERAL ML THAPAN PVSM (RETD.)

THE annual demands of the Ministry of Defence representing between a third and half of the Central Budget, are usually passed by the Lok Sabha without any detailed discussion. It is difficult to say whether this is because of general apathy or of ignorance of the technicalities of defence. The costs of defence, as of all other services provided by the Government, are rising. A compromise has to be reached somewhere and this can be based only on a balanced appreciation of a possible threat to the country's security from land, sea and air. Once this is done the rest can be left to professional executives responsible for defence. It is for the Government to accept the financial commitments that follow. In either case, Parliament must satisfy itself that defence does not go by default.

UNREALITY

It is very difficult to reconcile the conflicting demands of the three Armed Services for their share of the defence "cake". A great degree of cooperation and understanding is called for from their professional heads to keep budgetary planning on the rails. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Defence, a civilian body is not qualified professionally to assist in this matter. For some obscure reason the Government has not favoured appointing service officers to Secretariat posts, though the Defence and other Ministers have plenty of professional administrators, scientists, engineers and even police officers.

The preparation of individual Service budgets, therefore, tends to proceed in an atmosphere of unreality. Projections are constantly being revised downwards to match dwindling resources. The result is a perpetuation of the status quo. For example, about 75 % of the defence budget goes towards pay, allowances, pensions and rations for the troops; maintenance of buildings; transport, petrol, oil and lubricants; major works; acquisition of land, plant and machinery; and research and development. These may be called fixed charges. Of the rest 10 % is available for new equipment, weapons and so on, the balance being spent on clothing, tentage, medicines, training, ammunition and so on.

The pace of development of weapons technology and the increasing sophistication of military equipment make heavy demands. To be left behind in the race is to invite loss of morale among the troops. To forge ahead in the race requires an annual escalation in defence outlay, always an unpalatable decision for politicians to take. It would be sufficient if they displayed the political courage to sanction the funds required to keep abreast.

The experience of 1962 has taught us the elementary lesson that a price

*By Courtesy of "Statesman" (Published in the Statesmen of 13 Feb. 75.)

has to be paid for security. Economic development is compatible with defence, but only at a rate determined after ensuring the former. A myth has been created that expenditure on defence is a crushing burden on economic growth. This might be true in an ideal State, where human beings are civilized enough to live in peace with one another. Until this utopia arrives we have no choice but to pay our premium on security insurance. In a country where insurance has been nationalized, members of Parliament representing the policy holder have the right to ask that the security corporation is well managed, that premiums are kept as low as possible and that full cover is at hand at all times.

If the bulk of the defence budget is spent on fixed charges which are inelastic, where are the additional resources for modernization to come from? The need for economy is not denied but its scope is limited. Part of the additional resources must, therefore, come from increased outlay. The present expenditure on defence averages between 3% and 4% of the Gross National Product. Other countries are able to spend 6% or more, consistent with economic growth. If considerations of security so demand, proportionate increases in the outlay on defence must be provided and defence must be considered an integral part of the Five Year Plans.

There are possibilities of raising resources by increased productivity within the defence organization. Large sums are spent every year in procuring rations. Has Parliament considered the possibility of the defence services being entrusted with meeting this responsibility?

VENTURES

There is scope for setting up, on a commercial basis, sheep, fish and poultry farms managed by servicemen. This would mean a reduced dependence on contractors. Moreover, these farms would solve, to some extent, the problem of resettling servicemen. Similarly, the services could be entrusted with agricultural farms. There is also scope for enlarging the existing military dairy farms to meet in full the requirements of the Army.

The capital investment in such undertakings would be justified, whether or not the strength of the forces is run down at some future date. The defence services are well-known for their high level of organization and discipline. If nothing else, these ventures would serve as a model to others in the field, whether public or private, and thus fulfil a national purpose. And since they would be run on commercial lines, the State could always take them over to meet other public needs, once they have fulfilled the requirements of defence.

A more extensive use of the Border Roads Organization is another way to increase productivity. It was set up in the early 1960s to improve communications in the more inaccessible border areas. Since it has proved its worth beyond measure, could not its engineering talent be diversified and put to wider use? Reports often speak of delays and errors in civil constructions such as bridges, fly-overs, buildings, canals and so on. If the Govern-

ment is serious about completing such works on schedule, it could surely make use of the Border Roads Organization. To begin with there may be a marginal difference in costs, but this would be more than offset by the high standard of construction. Later, its tenders for public works will become competitive.

The use of surplus capacity in defence equipment factories to produce goods for civilian use also needs to be investigated more closely. They include readymade garments, leather, canvas and rubber goods, household hardware, kitchen utensils, motor vehicles, optical instruments and hand tools.

A major overhaul of the administrative machinery is also overdue. The Armed Forces have the largest stake in the defence organization; yet the services headquarters are regarded as "attached" offices of the Government. The primacy of civilian control is understood and accepted; its application, however, is clumsy and unintelligent. The bureaucracy has succeeded in devising procedures which are designed not to work. Civil servants ignorant of the ramifications of defence ask interminable questions and raise objections, and since financial control vests in the Ministry of Finance, dialogues degenerate into rambling discussions. The result is delay, diffusion of responsibility, and a near total absence of follow-up.

Suggestions for reorganization have been put forward from time to time such as for Army, Navy and Air Force Councils and the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff. They have not been approved. The devolution of financial control to the service headquarters and their integration with the Ministry of Defence will remove many present irritants. Economy can be practised only by those who have control over financial resources. After the defence budget is voted by Parliament, if each service, with integrated financial advisers, is given the freedom to administer its share, there would be a greater sense of involvement which would help to prevent non-essential expenditure. Both budgeting and expenditure would acquire greater realism and economies would be achieved.

PRODUCTION

The process would not be complete without closer supervision of defence production. The services must guarantee uninterrupted production. Third party control will not bring the same degree of involvement. Nor will it help to lay down priorities and to decide how scarce resources are to be allocated.

If defence has been a closed subject too long, it is time that some doors and windows are opened. There is no national military service in this country. Otherwise, the country's legislators might have had a better knowledge of the complex issues of defence. This must be remedied. The Armed Forces traditionally are not involved in politics few of their members take to politics after retirement. This is not to say that the country's legislators should not have the benefit of their experience. There is provision for nomination. It is time that this privilege is extended to cover the defence services.

THE CHALLENGE OF SELF SUFFICIENCY

LIEUT COLONEL AK GUPTA ENGINEERS

IT is the industry and the people which ultimately contribute to the strength of a nation. We are fortunate, thanks to our Great Nation Builders, that this land has a firm industrial base reinforced by excellent Scientific and Technological talent. But, in a serious emergency we may not be in a position to mobilise our Industrial Capacity and develop our full potential to be self-reliant with our present set-up in the field of defence production. This study highlights the necessity of utilisation of our industrial potential for defence. In doing so, reliance has been placed on recent history. It will be helpful to us since we are still far from the goal of self sufficiency in the design and production of armaments.

In most of the advanced countries like USA, UK, France and Germany, the bulk of Armament and Defence Industry is in the Private Sector. Even after independence, we continued following the British policy of keeping defence production exclusively in the public sector, which even the British at no time followed at home. It is only comparatively recently that the private sector has been permitted to make inroads into this exclusive field in a rather small and insignificant way. We have been purchasing equipment manufactured by private sector abroad. We have even invited private foreign firms to collaborate with us in our defence production. It is time, we invite our own private sector to collaborate in our defence production efforts.

Collaboration between industry and Government in England, in the sphere of design, development, and production of armaments stood the test of time during the worst crisis that England faced during World War II. An insight into this could lead us to useful clues which could be adopted by us, with or without suitable modifications depending on the peculiarity of circumstances.

HISTORICAL

¹Soon after 1918, in UK in the case of weapons and tanks of the Army, peace time research had to be maintained artificially since there was virtually no international armament trade and the private manufacturer of armament declined almost to the vanishing point in an atmosphere of public suspicion. Army could persuade only a very few firms to undertake research

¹History of the Second World War—Design and Development of Weapons by MM Postan, D Hay & JD Scott.

and development activity on its behalf. Contraction of the Army in twenties and its subsequent expansion in the thirties only aggravated this weakness. Army equipment ceased, by and large, to be manufactured by specialist firms, since it was becoming uneconomical. The tank, for example, proved to be distinctly unlike the products of any of the British heavy engineering firms with the lone exception of one firm engaged in the production of armament. At one stage, the motor industry appeared to be suited to tank development and production. It was later on found to be highly unsuited for either and the unsuitability increased as tanks grew bigger and heavier. This was possibly a time when peace-time military expenditure was regretted, if not frowned upon, and the technical officer within the army was despised, which was nothing unusual even in our own country more than a decade ago. Britain being on the winning side, probably did not realise at this stage that it will have to fight a major World War within two decades, not of its own choosing. From this state of unpreparedness in the early twenties, the Industry was geared up to successfully face an emergency forced upon a nation by outside aggression. The industrial organisation prevailing then is studied further.

GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY

It is not easy to pick out a simple pattern from the complicated relationship prevailing between the Government establishments, and Industry during the pre-war and war-years. Competition amongst themselves was almost the corner stone of policy in the design and production of arms. The most important Army establishment was the Armaments Design Department. The normal process for the Ordnance Board was to prepare a specification for a new weapon in considerable details, with the next step of sending this specification not only to the design department but also to a commercial firm for the production of a comparative design. Competition between such Government firms e.g., Woolwich and Enfield and private firms like Vickers and BSA was an established practice, fully approved by the Ordnance Board and the higher authorities throughout the pre-war and war-years. As a result of this were produced a number of successful Army and Naval guns like 4.5", 4.7", 5.5", the 25 pdr and so on, where one or the other party was the successful competitor. There were however certain spheres in which, one or the other had a monopoly. Private sector contributed towards the development of other non-lethal equipment also. The best example of this is the development of a high power light weight compression ignition marine engine. From the considerable number of engines and proposals examined, including designs put forward by several British firms and the Admiralty Engineering Laboratory, the committee finally selected a design by Ricardo & Co. Engineering Ltd.

Next, consider trade monopoly. Design and production of certain equipment, particularly used by the RAF, was the virtual monopoly of the private sector, where Government participation in a commercially profitable

field was viewed with disfavour. Even a proposal to include a certain amount of production work among the functions of the Royal Air Craft Establishments had to be dropped since the proposal appeared to trespass on the sphere of Industry. The Air Ministry refused to provide itself with Royal Air Craft Factories. Instead, the Ministry tried to the best of its ability to keep in being a group of established firms making air craft and engines. To quote Air Chief Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding in an article published on 8 April 43, in the *Evening Standard*;

"The derisory sums voted for the technical equipment of the RAF produced types of aircraft and engines which compare favourably with those of other nations———. One of the basic causes of this comparative efficiency was, in my opinion, the fact, that Government departments took no positive part in the design and production of air craft and engines".

A similar point of view was propagated by Lord Beaver Brook, in Air Ministry, who on 27 Jan 43 announced in a debate in the House of Lords, that "he based his entire exposition of the Air Craft Industry on the proposition that His Majesty's Government depended for quality of air craft on the firms producing them. Beginning with the design of the air craft, the responsibility of the firm prevails there." "In fact", he continued, "the aeroplane depends on the work of the firm".

Thus, relations varied greatly at different times and in different sectors. At their points of greatest contrast, they ran from direct competition to close collaboration. Where the industry had a long tradition of autonomy and success, or even autonomy alone—the Government establishments never found it easy to extend their influence on design. On the other hand, rivalry between Industry and Government could be friendly too. Outstanding examples of the same are the successful collaboration between Armaments Design Department and Vickers and also between the Central Metallurgical Laboratory and the Imperial Chemical Industries.² 'Tube Alloys' was a code name for nuclear energy for which the Imperial Chemical Industries placed at the disposal of the British Government the services of their specialists in this field.

FEAR OF MONOPOLY

The relationship elaborated above leads us to two distinct conclusions:

- (a) Many private firms had a history of monopoly in the field of Defence Production. How far the individual firms tried to exploit this monopolistic situation to achieve individual and selfish gains cannot be stated with clarity or precision. But corporate profit motives were never allowed to eclipse national goals. To quote one such occasion of service in a super emergency, was the crisis in the spring of 1938, which followed Hitler's march into Vienna,

²Second World War—Churchill, Vol. IV, Chapter XX.

which led to the emergency air craft programme of 12,000 aircraft by April 1940, when sweeping away all financial impediments the Government decided to place as many orders as the Industry could undertake to fulfil by the spring of 1940. Why are we so obsessed by the real or imaginary fears of the trade acquiring a monopoly in any field? Are we less patriotic? In fact FN of Belgium and the Zbrojovka BRNO plant of Czechoslovakia had the World's MAUSER Military Rifle market to themselves to a great extent during the period 1924-38³.

- (b) Industry got associated with Defence Production from the stage of the drawing board which is very different from the practice followed in India. Even the way for issue of the official specification and for the submission of preliminary designs was paved by constant and informal collaboration between Government officials and private designers. Thus the Industry and the state were partners in the business of design and development, from the earliest stages. In India, 'Development', by private sector is understood to mean the 'Initial Production' of the store and not development from design stage. It will be pertinent to ask whether our Engineering Industry to-day is, even less developed than was the British Engineering Industry in early twenties? Or do we hesitate to place reliance on their skill, ingenuity, and capacity to design even simple equipment? Or is the Indian Engineering Industry simply not interested in development work? We should at least make an effort to associate industry in development work under the guidance of Resident Technical Officers from the Armed Forces. The joint efforts will give our design services a wider base and the benefit of expertise hitherto unutilized.

RECENT TRENDS

Reliance on the private producer of armament as far as known has not reduced in any country so far. It is perhaps greater today. FN Belgium is the most prolific designer and producer of successful Small Arms in service and has probably the largest Small Arms plant in the Western World today. This organisation was founded in 1889 by a combine of Liege interests and Ludwig Loewe and Co of Berlin. The UK has adopted the 7.62 mm NATO FN automatic Rifle and is producing the same at BSA and also at one of the Royal Small Arms Factories⁵. Sterling submachine gun was developed, after World War II by the Sterling Engineering Co of Dagenham Essex. (This weapon was used extensively by the planters in Kenya during MAU MAU uprising). The USA is perhaps unique in the relatively large proportion of specialized products and services for defence, provided by its private sector.

³Small Arms of the World by WHB Smith.

⁴Proceedings of Association of Indian Engineering Industries Workshop, Calcutta, November, 1975.

⁵Small Arms of the World by WHB Smith.

The defence sector of the US economy lies only partly within the realm of its public enterprise. Giant corporations like General Dynamics, Lockheed Mc Donnell Douglas, North American Rockwell and several others are the chief purveyors of arms for the Defence Forces. About two thirds of their output is ordered by the Pentagon.⁶ In 1969, such orders totalled 39,000 million dollars. These firms specialise in the production of supersonic aircrafts, Missiles, radars, computers and electronic equipment.

CONCLUSION

Ideological considerations must not hold us back. Evidence is already forthcoming that we are on the way to giving up our one time narcissistic adherence to it. Even China has given up its ideological inhibitions.⁷ In 1975, it approached USA and West Europe with a 200 million dollar deal for acquiring armament technology. With the aero-engine technology supplied by Rolls Royce, China may soon be able to mass produce Mach 2 fighter bombers. In any case, mass furore or ideology is no substitute to technology.

The critics of the private sector are never in short supply. But to fight a major war, we have to maintain sources which have the facilities and demonstrated know-how to produce specialized military equipment. These sources have to be developed during peace time. A system which has worked so well in so many countries and has stood the test of time particularly during the crisis racked years, should be given a fair trial in our country. We have a highly organised and expanding industrial base in diverse fields like engineering, explosives, electronics, metallurgical and textile industries which can help broaden the industrial base of defence production. Let us have a mixed and diverse pattern of private and Government ownership serving the needs of defence. I see no reason why should we not start planning right now for a military industrial complex coming up in the private sector as a part answer to the challenge of self-sufficiency.

⁶Soviet Military Review 1972, Vol. 10.

⁷Amrita Bazar Patrika—11 April, 1976.

ARMIES OF INDIA FROM THE ARYANS TO THE MARATHAS

JEFFREY GREENHUT*

NO factor determines the growth and direction of an early culture so profoundly as geography, and India is no exception. India is a sub-continent both closed and open. Separated from the rest of the world on two sides by oceans, and along the northern borders by great mountain ranges, its relative isolation enabled it to develop in its own fashion and its own way throughout most of recorded history. Internally, however, the great sweeping plain of Northern India provides no natural boundaries if the mountain passes should be breeched. Thus the military history of India consists of successive invasions through the mountain passes of the Northwest, followed by gradual disintegration of the state established by the invaders, and then a new invasion. Each new invader had his own system of military organization, weaponry, and tactics. But the geography and the culture of Northern India soon influenced the new military system so that it gradually took on many of the characteristics of the old.

THE ARYANS

Around three thousand years ago, the original civilization of India, that of the Indus Valley, entered a period of great decline. Whether this decline was caused by pressure on the Northwestern Frontier by the Aryans, or whether the Aryans moved in to fill a power vacuum is impossible to determine. Yet probably sometime in this period this great wave of invaders out of Central Asia entered India. Like generations of invaders to come, the Aryan invaders were horse nomads. They were tribal in culture and bronze age in technology. Semi-nomadic pastoralists living chiefly on the produce of their cattle, their military system depended on the domestication of the horse. It was the horse which they held in highest veneration, and the horse which enabled them to complete the subjugation of the remnants of the Indus Valley civilization.

Originally, their military system was based on their social structure, Stratification among tribal peoples is usually rudimentary, with the chief and his lieutenants far closer to the mass of the people than is common in more developed societies. In the early period, the Aryan chief and his lieutenants fought from chariots, while the majority of the tribal groups fought on foot in an unordered mass.¹

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¹A. Berriedale Keith, "The Age of the Rigveda", *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. I, *Ancient India*, ed. by E.J. Rapson (Delhi : S. Chand and Company, 1968), p. 88.

Unlike the people of the West, whose fighting habits were determined by the heavy woods and rolling terrain of the European forests, the Aryans came out of Central Asia with its great flat plain posing no limitation to mobility and range. Thus the chariot was their arm of decision, and in the Vedic period the Aryan chariots were of simple construction based upon the necessity to break them down and carry them on a nomadic march. Their most honorable weapon was the bow which, unlike the bows of primitive tribes, was drawn to the ear, but they also employed swords, spears, and axes. Coats of mail were known, but no evidence exists to support the supposition that they fought from horseback. This indicates that they lacked the stirrup.

As the Aryans moved eastward from the Indus, a gradual distinction took place between those who fought from chariots and those who laboured and fought on foot. A class of warriors grew up, freed of the labour of agriculture, whose function was to surround the king and be ready for battle.² By the sixth century B.C. the Aryan army was responsible only to the king and all tribal controls upon it had lapsed.³ As the Aryan state developed, war became an expensive and formal matter. A code of chivalry developed which governed conduct between Aryans.⁴ The code, far advanced for its day, prevented the use of barbed and poisoned arrows, and protected prisoners and unarmed and wounded men.⁵ Further, war took on a semi-religious tone, as Brahmins regarded it as an *Upa-Veda*, a supplementary part of divinely inspired knowledge.⁶

Tactically, the army changed very little. They used the cavalry primarily as mounted archers, but the basic weapons were still the chariot and the foot archer.⁷ As the state developed, so did the bureaucracy. High level military administration was split off and distinguished from civil administration. Yet the close relationship of military and political action was recognized, for the army included a Department of Diplomacy.⁸

By the sixth century B.C. the synthesis of Aryan and Indus cultures had developed the Hindu civilization. The Hindu states did not yet possess a standing army, and when the army was called to battle it followed the Aryan pattern of foot and chariots. Elephants had not yet been domesticated for war.⁹

²Sir William Wilson Hunter, *The Indian Empire* (3rd ed.), (London: Smith, Elder and Company, 1892), p. 131.

³Charles Drekmeier, *Kingship and Community in Early India*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 96.

⁴Drekmeier, p. 23.

⁵Mountstuart Elphinstone, *The History of India* (7th ed.), (London: John Murray, 1889), p. 26.

⁶Hunter, p. 152.

⁷J.W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian*, (Calcutta: Chatterjee, Chatterjee and Company, Ltd., 1960), pp. 225-6.

⁸Bimal Kanti Majumdar, *The Military System in Ancient India*, (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960), pp. 15-6.

⁹D.D. Kosambi, *The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 123-37.

THE DECCANNI KINGS

South of the great plain of North India, military development was also under way. The culture of the Deccan was, like the original Aryan culture, tribal in origin. The early Deccanni kings recognized that if they were to break up the tribal structure and establish a powerful central government, they would need a non-tribal army. One of the first recorded instances of economic development for a political end was when, in the sixth century B.C., the Deccanni kings began to clear heavy jungle and bring wasteland under the plough. The settlers on this new land now owed their property not to the tribe but to the king. It was from this new class that the king recruited his professional army.¹⁰

By the beginning of the fourth century B.C. better methods of organization and technological development had added cavalry and war elephants to the army. The foot soldier had declined in quality if not quantity. The chariot was still considered the arm of decision. Soldiers in these armies were trained systematically and were probably relatively regularly paid.¹¹

The military equipment of this period showed no great improvement over that of the Aryans. Infantry wore cotton quilted armor and carried bows and spears, as did the cavalry. Chariots had grown larger and now carried six men. The cavalry, still without the stirrup, was inferior to the chariot. Elephants had been domesticated and became a weapon of war.¹² With their immense size elephants fascinated Indian military leaders who were never free from the theory that elephants could somehow be made decisive on the battlefield. Yet in terms of mobility and striking power they were little more effective than chariots, since they carried only four men, the mahout and three archers.¹³ Some Indian rulers recognized the unreliability of elephants and did not use them directly as weapons but instead as observation platforms and to frighten the horses of enemy cavalry.¹⁴

By the third century B.C. the Hindu military system had become ritualized. Of the seven classes recognized by Megasthenes, the fighters were the second most numerous. They performed no work in their communities but that of fighting, and their community provided their weapons and kept their horses and elephants for them. They received regular pay in time of peace, so while not fighting they lived a ease and maintained numbers of dependents.¹⁵ This military system received a great shock with the invasion of Alexander the Great.

¹⁰B.K. Majumdar, pp. 26-30.

¹¹R.C. Majumdar, H.C. Raychaudhuri and Kalikinkar Datta, *An Advance History of India*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 73.

¹²Majumdar, Raychaudhuri and Datta, p. 73.

¹³Mc Crindle, p. 89.

¹⁴R.C. Majumdar, *The Classical Accounts of India*, (Calcutta: Frima K.L. Mukopadhyay, 1960), p. 38.

¹⁵E.R. Bevan, "India in Early Greek and Latin Literature," *The Cambridge History of India, Vol I, Ancient India*, ed. by E.J. Rapson, (Delhi: S. Chand and Company, 1968), hereafter cited as Cambridge Vol. I, pp. 368-9.

Alexander was one of the few leaders of antiquity who was able to effectively use cavalry prior to the invention of the stirrup. He armed them with a bow, and the superior mobility of the cavalry and the long range of their weapons easily defeated the chariots of the Indian army. The chariots, no longer the light, easily drawn models of the early Aryans, had become heavy, slow, and prone to bog down.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the organizational ability of even the local Indian states could oppose Alexander with large military forces. Porus, only a local monarch, opposed the army of Alexander with 30,000 efficient infantry, 4000 cavalry, 3000 chariots, and 200 elephants.¹⁷

CHANDRAGUPTA

Sometime after the withdrawal of Alexander's armies from India, the first great empire of India developed. Like all the empires to follow, it was based on a strong military system and a large standing army. The Empire established by Chandragupta maintained a vast standing army numbering hundreds of thousands of troops.¹⁸ Military bureaucracy to support such a force was highly developed, and by the turn of the fourth century B.C. the military had been organized into six divisions: liaison, logistics, infantry, cavalry, war chariots, and elephants.¹⁹ According to Pliny the army was immense, having a strength of 600,000 foot, 30,000 cavalry, and 9000 elephants, as well as a chariot corps.²⁰ The class structure of the army as a basis of recruiting had been dispensed with, both practically and theoretically. The troops included hereditary troops, feudatory troops, mercenaries, guild levies, and tribal troops. The hereditary troops and the majority of the mercenaries were Kshatriyas, as they were considered to be the most reliable. Guild troops were city militias who were probably available only when their city was threatened. Tribesmen were employed as auxiliaries.²¹ The central government provided all equipment for the army.²² The art of fortification was well developed. The great cities of the Empire had ditches, ramparts, earthen walls, or walls of wood or brick, having battlements, towers, water gates, portcullises, and a wide street running around the interior face of the wall. To insure the loyalty of the city, the Emperor scattered guardhouses throughout.²³

Military theory was well advanced. The *Arthashastra* discussed types of battles, categories of battles, methods and time of march, advice for training exercises, maintenance, and discipline.²⁴ By the first century A.D. India's war theory had advanced even further. The state was to avoid war if possible

¹⁶R.C. Majumdar, p. 36.

¹⁷Hunter, p. 211.

¹⁸Drekmeier, p. 171.

¹⁹Mc Crindle, p. 88.

²⁰Majumdar, Raychaudhuri, and Datta, p. 120.

²¹F.W. Thomas, "Political and Social Organization of the Maurya Empire," in Cambridge Vol. I, pp. 441-2.

²²McCrindle, p. 88.

²³Thomas, p. 429.

²⁴B. K. Majumdar, p. 66.

and only to engage in war when attempts at peaceful settlement had failed. A formal code governing hostilities was in wide use. It governed the use of weapons against non-combatants, those fleeing, the wounded, the unarmed. In addition a chivalric code was in use. A warrior could fight only those armed as well as himself. Ambushes were prohibited.²⁵

THE GUPTA EMPIRE

The Gupta Empire, 300 to 700 A.D., could field large armies. As before, the army consisted primarily of foot soldiers, but also included cavalry, elephant troops and charioteers. Theoretically, a single division of the army consisted of 109,000 infantry, 65,000 cavalry, 21,000 elephants, and 21,000 chariots.²⁶ These figures seem somewhat exaggerated.

The tactics of the Guptas, however, had been influenced by the reduction in jungle terrain and the mobile Sythian cavalry. Pre-Mauryan and Mauryan strategy had centered around the use of huge elephant forces which were useful in jungle and in positional warfare. However, mobile cavalry had defeated these. The Guptas remodeled the army on the Sythian pattern, with armored horsemen armed with lance and bow. Cavalry fought in well-ordered lines and close formation, and the chariot fell into disuse.²⁷

Increasing use of the cavalry by the Guptas led to the problem of horse supply. Neither then nor ever was India suitable ground for the breeding and raising of horses. Yet cavalry was such an obviously superior force that Indian rulers felt they needed large quantities of horses. The expense of providing horses to its cavalry would become the major military expenditure of the state.

The Gupta military system, unlike the Mauryan, was decentralized, showing both the inability of the government to enforce its will, and the increasing rise of the jati system which made strong central government less necessary for the maintenance of social order.²⁸ The Guptas relied upon the land tax to support the army, and the villages often paid their taxes directly to the army when it was nearby. Conscription seems to have existed, although whether it extended beyond the Kshatriya class is unknown.²⁹

THE HARSHA EMPIRE

The next major empire in India after the Guptas was the Harsha Empire which, like its predecessors, depended on a strong standing army.³⁰

²⁵Drekmeier, pp. 139-40.

²⁶N.K. Sidhanta, *The Heroic Age of India*, (London : Kegan Paul, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1929), pp. 139-40.

²⁷B. Majumdar, p. 90.

²⁸B. Majumdar, p. 81.

²⁹Drekmeier, p. 175.

³⁰William Harrison Moreland and Atul Chandra Chatterjee, *A Short History of India*, (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1957), p. 106.

³¹K.A. Kilakanta Sastri "The Chalukyas of Kalyani," in G. Yazdani, *The Early History of the Deccan* hereafter cited as Yazadani, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 417-8.

The army, also like its predecessors, maintained the tradition of recruiting from all classes, not just Kshatriyas.³¹ But some changes had taken place. By the seventh century A.D. chariots were clearly obsolete, their place being taken by elephants.³² By this time the stirrup had been introduced and more use was made of cavalry, although it had not yet become the arm of decision. The Harshas used it for reconnaissance, surprise, pursuit, and rear attacks. They did not yet understand the use of the horse-bowman. Thus they armed the cavalry with lance or sword, only occasionally issuing a bow.³³ Logistically, the army was well organized. On the march it was followed by a long train of supply wagons carrying rations, medicine, forage, spare parts, and weapons. Further logistical support was provided by civilians including artisans, engineers, carpenters, smiths, surgeons, and merchants.³⁴ All of this indicates a highly efficient, well organized bureaucracy.

In the tenth century no single empire controlled the Northern Indian states. The various Hindu kings, however, recognized the need for military force and usually maintained standing armies trained and paid in times of peace. In war they supplemented these forces by contingents recruited from tribes and possibly from general levies of the kings subjects. In the Rajput kingdoms, the basis of the army was tribal, but in other kingdoms mercenary troops were employed.³⁵ The Hindu kings resorted to drafts in time of war because of financial restraints on the size of the standing army.

THE TURKS

In the eleventh century, under the impact of the invading Turks, the Hindu military system collapsed. The primary cause of the collapse was the climate of India and the impossibility of breeding large numbers of horses under such conditions. Being unable to breed horses, Hindu kings were always short of cavalry, and being short of it, never relied upon it. Since they could never rely upon it, they never learned how to use it well or how to defend against it. They had no knowledge of how to use it in the charge as shock action, or of how to harass enemy troops with it. Their elephant corps was an attempt to make up for their lack of mobility, but it was of doubtful value. Further, their rules of war prohibited flank or rear attacks, and the very size and resultant immobility of the foot mobile army restricted them to what was essentially positional warfare in which smaller and more mobile enemy cavalry forces could defeat them. Finally, the political structure of many separate states did not support one army or a unified command, but only a collection of levies and allies impossible to control. Perhaps all of this would not have prevented the Hindu states from defending against a mediocre force of invaders, but they were fighting the Turks.³⁶

³¹Jeannine Auboyer, *Daily Life in Ancient India*, trans. by Simon Watson Taylor, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 28-32.

³²Auboyer, p. 284.

³³Auboyer, pp. 283-6.

³⁴Moreland, pp. 120.

³⁵B. Majumdar, pp. 148-50.

The Turkish Emperors of the Delhi Sultanate knew that their power rested primarily upon the sword. Thus their administration paid great attention to the army. The Sultanate had a Ministry of War whose chief was the administrator of the army. He was not a tactical leader of troops, but his responsibilities did include recruiting, promotion, assignment, pay, and logistics. He was assisted by a large clerical staff both at Delhi and in the provinces. He kept a muster role of each soldier, and supervised the branding of horses to prevent fraud by subordinate officials.³⁷ Up to the fourteenth century troops were paid on the assignment system, many of the troops living in the villages from which they collected their pay. This meant significant delays in mobilization, so that by the fourteenth century the Sultanate kept a large standing army in the capital and paid it in cash.³⁸ The difficulties of transporting an army over such broad distances of the North Indian plain led to the distribution of the remaining troops throughout the country. These troops, commanded by the provincial governor, were responsible for coping with local disorders. Reinforcements could be brought in from neighboring areas or from Delhi if the situation warranted.³⁹

The mounted horse archer was the most important force in this army. Each archer wore light armour and armed himself with a bow and sword. At times, they armoured their horses. However, the Sultans succumbed to the siren's call of the elephant and considered a single elephant to be as effective in battle as 500 horses. As many as 1400 elephants were taken on campaign, and many of the Shahs kept 3000 in the stables. Elephants were considered so important that they became a status symbol. No one might possess an elephant without royal permission.

For their infantry the Sultanate recruited mostly Hindus and people who could not afford horses. Since they were slower than cavalry, the Sultanate did not use them in campaigns which required swift movement.⁴⁰

Like the army of the Guptas, the army was decentralized. Unlike the Guptas, the regular soldiers received direct grants of land whose revenue supported them. Granting of land gradually reduced the effectiveness of the army since land grants became hereditary rather than based on individual efficiency and competence.⁴¹ On the other hand, the Sultanate had a well organized engineering department which could construct fortifications, fortify encampments, and throw pontoon bridges across rivers. On one campaign, 100,000 woodcutters accompanied the army.⁴² The entire army itself reached great size. Ala-ud-din Khilji commanded 475,000 horse, and Muhammad bin Thuglak was said to command almost 900,000.⁴³ Support-

³⁷Tshtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi* (5th rev. ed.) (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1971), pp. 37-8.

³⁸Moreland, p. 152.

³⁹Qureshi, p. 139.

⁴⁰Qureshi, pp. 140-4.

⁴¹Majumdar, Raychaudhuri, and Datta, p. 333.

⁴²Qureshi, p. 145.

⁴³Qureshi, pp. 155-6.

ing an army of such large size required great logistical foresight. The Sultana established supply depots throughout the state so that an army on the march would not have to plunder to maintain itself. Unfortunately if the army left the state, it depended either on tributary chiefs to supply it, or on plunder. The army resorted to plunder only as a last resort because plundering a district quickly depleted all its resources and the army, unsupported, had to move on.⁴⁴

The theoreticians of the period paid due regard to weather and terrain. They discussed ambushes and attacks, but their recommendations for the disposition of the forces on the battlefield were rigid. The army always ordered for battle with a centre, two wings, a vanguard, and a rear guard. They placed elephants to the front, and preceded them by armed slaves.⁴⁵

While the major military states were in North India, some attention should be paid to the contrasting military organization of the Deccan. The terrain in the Deccan was mountainous and hilly affording little room for the sweeping charges and huge armies of the Northern Plain. The Deccani armies depended mostly on foot soldiers selected from village militias. These kingdoms directly recruited their standing armies and supplemented them by local levies commanded by provincial officials.⁴⁶ The Deccani states were organized on a military basis and territory was apportioned among military chiefs. The states distributed land in lieu of salary and those who held land had to maintain a stipulated body of military force and also pay taxes. Their tactics depended on a combination of foot armies and strong points consisting of forts built on dominant terrain features.⁴⁷

THE MOGHULS

The Delhi Sultanate disintegrated into a number of Hindu and Muslim states, none of which was strong enough to resist an invasion of a new wave of Turks, under the leadership of Babur. Babur had spent most of his life fighting, and what he had learnt showed in the organization of his army. It was not divided into regiments, but among the great followers of Babur, all of whom had had much service in the field. The fighting men consisted of ethnic turks, although after entering and establishing himself on the Indian plain, Babur recruited local levies and formed bands of mercenaries.⁴⁸

By the sixteenth century and the emperor Akbar, the Moghuls had established their military system. At the centre stood a relatively small standing army commanded, paid and equipped by the Emperor. Under Akbar it did not exceed 45,000 cavalry, 5000 elephants, and a mass of little esteemed

⁴⁴Qureshi, pp. 147-8.

⁴⁵Qureshi, p. 149.

⁴⁶A. L. Altekar, "The Yadvas of Seunadesa," in Yazdani, pp. 513-63.

⁴⁷N. Venkataramanayya and M. Somasekhara Sarma, "The Kakatiyas of Warangal", in Yazdani, pp. 666-70.

⁴⁸William Erskine, *A History of India under the Two First Sovereigns of the House of Taimur, Baber and Humayun*, (2 vols.), (London : Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1854), pp. 540-1.

foot. For this army the Moghuls provided no standing logistical support.⁴⁹ Most of Akbar's strength consisted of contingents raised and commanded by chieftains or high imperial officers. The troops so recruited were mostly cavalry who were formed into regiments, but regulations did not require them to drill or to observe uniformity in dress or arms.⁵⁰ Thus the army was not an imperial army and the soldiers did not owe direct allegiance to the Emperor.⁵¹ Until 1575 Akbar paid officers by assigning them land reserves, but during that year he reformed the military system so that officers were paid in cash. He also reintroduced the system of branding horses as a check upon fraud.⁵²

Akbar's policy was to recruit officers on the basis of talent, and he required that any who desired to be an officer in the Moghul administration should start at the lowest level and rise by virtue of service to state. The only exception to this rule was that very high rank was, with few exceptions, reserved for princes of royal blood.⁵³ Nonetheless, the long range trend of Moghul administrative direction in military affairs, notwithstanding Akbar's reforms, was quantity over quality. Theoretically, Akbar could call into the field a force of almost four and a half million cavalrymen.⁵⁴ Practically, of course, no one even remotely approached this figure.

The bureaucracy into which such enormous amounts of money flowed to support this non-existent force was both corrupt and inefficient. The army it supported became increasingly huge, unwieldy, and unmarshal. With the death of Akbar, the decline of the Moghul army began.

The decline first became apparent in the inability of the Moghul officers to order their army in battle, indicating an ill-disciplined force led by an untrained officer corps. According to Mandelslo, a native of Germany who travelled to India and reported in 1638, the army fought in a disordered manner, knowing nothing of the distinction of vanguard, main body, and rear guard. Yet technologically they kept abreast of the West. They adopted an artillery arm divided into light and heavy artillery. They also experimented with camel-mounted swivel guns. However, all the heavy artillery was under the direction of Christian gunners, indicating a lack of real dedication by the Moghul commanders to the new arm.⁵⁶ Further, they were unable to cast cannons that matched those of the West and their cannons often exploded, making them unreliable in battle.⁵⁷

⁴⁹Vincent A. Smith, *Akbar, The Great Mogul*, (Oxford The Clarendon Press, 1917), p. 361.

⁵⁰Smith, p. 360.

⁵¹Majumdar, Raychaudhuri, and Datta, p. 563.

⁵²R.P. Tripathi, *Rise and Fall of the Moghal Empire* (3rd ed.), (Allahabad: Central Book Depot, 1963), p. 230.

⁵³Tripathi, p. 231.

⁵⁴Frederick Augustus, *The Emperor Akbar* (trans. and rev. by Annette S. Beveridge), (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink, and Company, 1890), p. 286.

⁵⁵Stanley Lane-Poole, *Medieval India under Mohammedan Rule (A.D. 712-1964)*, (Delhi: The University Book and Stationery Company, 1963), p. 236.

⁵⁶SurendraNath Sen (ed.), *Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri*, (New Delhi: National Archives of Delhi, 1949), p. 243.

⁵⁷Sen, p. 157.

Under Shah Jehan the process of increasing bureaucratization and expense and decreasing military efficiency became more apparent. By far the largest portion of the revenues of the state was absorbed by the army and its bureaucracy, both of which he maintained on lavish scale. While the army never came up to its nominal strength, it was always larger than necessary and poorly trained.⁵⁸ Shah Jehan could bring no fewer than 450,000 men to the field, of which 200,000 were cavalry, 8000 officers, 7000 household troops, and 40,000 musketeers and artillerymen, plus an additional 185,000 cavalymen commanded by princes and noblemen.⁵⁹ Yet only the nobility officered this huge force and, serving as members of family units, had clan and tribal loyalties greater than their loyalty to the Emperor. This was partly offset by the fact that the troops did not necessarily belong to the same jati as that of the noble since no system of proportional enlistment based on jati existed.⁶⁰

By Aurangzeb's time the Moghul army had declined even further. The cavalry went into the field loaded down with heavy armour, saddles, and trappings. They were no longer the light horse archers of the steppes of Asia but were similar to the European knight, more concerned with survival and loot than with military efficiency.⁶¹ The army was purely a mercenary force. There was no conscription and no fines for those who did not serve. Every soldier served voluntarily, and every soldier of equal rank, Muslim or Hindu, drew equal pay.⁶² The army was no longer a force loyal to the Empire, but rather loyal to their own individual leader so long as he could supply them with pay and booty.

THE MARATHAS

The decline of the Moghul army would not have been noticed, and indeed might not have been serious, had not the Moghul Empire been challenged by one of the great regional powers of India, the Marathas. The Marathas, though fierce fighters prior to this period, had not posed a threat to the Moghul Empire because they had served as mercenaries for the Moghul emperors.⁶³ All this changed, however, with the succession of Shivaji to the throne of the Marathas. Shivaji introduced a regular standing army whose men served a full twelve months instead of the old system in which they served six months followed by six months of working the land. Further, he introduced a military organization which bypassed the simplistic decimal

⁵⁸S.M. Edwardes and H.L. O. Garrett, *Moghal Rule in India*, (Delhi : S. Chand and Company, 1962), p. 135.

⁵⁹Edwardes, p. 123.

⁶⁰Rafi Ahmad Alavi, "New Light on Mughal Cavalry" *Medieval India, A. Miscellany* (2 vols.), (New York: Asia Publishing House, cl 1972), vol. 2, p. 70.

⁶¹Elphinstone, pp. 659-660.

⁶²Jadunath Sarkar, "Aurangzib (1658-1681)" in *The Cambridge History of India, Vol. IV, The Mughul Period*, ed. by Wolseley Haig and Richard Burn, (Delhi: S. Chand and Company, 1963, hereafter cited as Cambridge Vol. IV), p. 241.

⁶³Surendra Nath Sen, *The Military System of the Marathas*, (Calcutta: Orient Longman's Private, Ltd., 1958), pp. 4-6.

organization of the Moghuls. The basic unit was a squadron of twenty-five cavalymen, five squadrons making a troop, and ten troops, a regiment. To each squadron he attached a farrier and a water boy. The infantry as well was organized into squads, with five squads to a platoon and three platoons to a company.⁶⁴ This breakdown of Shivaji's shows that he had an intuitive understanding of the span of control of an individual on the battlefield. These are approximately the same numbers used in modern military structures.

While Shivaji was consolidating his rule within the Maratha territory, he maintained more infantry than cavalry. However, when his followers began to expand and raid, they reduced their proportion of infantry from between forty to sixty per cent down to ten per cent, all the remainder being cavalry.⁶⁵ Shivaji also increased the number of regular cavalry directly hired by him, and concurrently reduced the proportion of cavalry responsible to native chieftains. He selected his officers, both infantry and cavalry, for their competence, and provided allowances for the disabled and pensions for widows.⁶⁶ By the time the Marathas came up against major Moghul forces, they had become what the Moghuls had originally been—light cavalry. They armed themselves with sword, matchlock, and bamboo lance. They were swift, strong, and mobile. They could not stand against a heavy charge, but could disperse and harass main bodies of enemy troops.⁶⁷ Moving with little baggage or equipment, they could cover up to fifty miles in a single march.⁶⁸ The Moghul armies were no match for them. Yet they never fully developed the tactical use of the cavalry. It was adequate for raiding, but never became the overwhelming instrument of war it had been under the Turks and other Central Asian peoples.

Both the army of the Moghul Empire and the army of the Marathas show great similarities in their decline. In both cases the decentralization of the army was one of the principal factors in the disintegration of the political body. Both states resorted to what was essentially a feudal system in the raising of troops, in which land was given in return for military service. Leaders of both states advocated policies of religious intolerance, the Marathas advocating militant Hinduism, and Aurangzeb and his successors advocating a militant Islam. Personal aggrandizement of the officers led to divisions within the army and, particularly in the Moghul Empire, jealousy among the commanders reached such proportions that they would throw away a victory rather than aid a rival. Finally, both armies became deficient in military efficiency. The Moghuls were so undisciplined that the army eventually became nothing more than an untrained mob.⁶⁹ The Marathas were unable to keep pace with military methods brought in by the British and were defeated by them.⁷⁰

⁶⁴Edwardes, p. 99.

⁶⁵Surendra Nath Sen, pp. 64-5.

⁶⁶Surendra Nath Sen, pp. 9-18.

⁶⁷Elphinstone, p. 660.

⁶⁸Surendra Nath Sen, p. 15.

⁶⁹Wolseley Haig, "Muhammad Shah," in Cambridge Vol. IV, pp. 374-6.

⁷⁰Surendra Nath Sen, pp. xvii-xviii.

This three thousand year survey of Indian military development shows recurring patterns. The ideal army for conquering the great flat plain of Northern India was composed of light mobile horse archers and, until the advent of the British by sea, all conquering forces into India met this pattern. Yet once they conquered India and established an empire, the factors which had prevented an effective defence by the occupying power went to work on the structure of the invading force. The few geographic boundaries meant that there were constant internal power struggles between regional groups. A chronic shortage of horses, and poor communication, led eventually to the downfall of the central government because of its inability to control outlying provinces. Once the central state disintegrated, a new grouping of smaller states arose, unified only by the success of a new invader who established mastery over the entire North Indian plain. The military organizations of the early states were superior to those of the later states. Asoka's system was more centralized and controllable than was that of the Gupta's. Those of the Guptas and the Delhi Sultanate were better at their height than that of the Moghuls. Asoka could bypass the jati system and establish a strong central government. His successors were increasingly unable to do so.

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INDIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE SECOND WORLD WAR

P. N. KHERA

WHEN the war broke out in September 1939, the position in India was that the Indian National Congress, the premier political organisation of the country, was ruling in seven out of eleven British provinces since the elections of 1937 which had ushered in Provincial Autonomy under the Government of India Act of 1935. The Muslim League, a communal organisation, had not formed a ministry in any of the remaining four provinces, though three of them had Muslim Premiers and Muslim majorities.

The Congress had, in December 1929, adopted complete independence as its goal. This was followed by nearly five years of agitations, non-cooperation movements under Gandhi, discussions, conferences (including the Round Table Conference in London) outlawing of the Congress, rule by ordinances, defiance of ordinances and arrests of nationalist leaders and workers culminating in the Act of 1935. And yet the Act as finally passed was a far cry from independence and nowhere near even Dominion Status which the Viceroy had declared as the "natural issue of India's constitutional progress" as far back as 1929.

Briefly, the Act of 1935 had two main features: Provincial Autonomy which introduced responsible government in the British Provinces and an all-India federation of British provinces and those princely states which were willing to accede to it. The federal government was to be only partly responsible to the legislature with the more important subjects like Defence and Foreign Affairs to be "reserved" and administered by officers directly responsible to the Governor General and through him to the British Government in London. Of this scheme only the first part—Provincial Autonomy—was introduced in 1937, the second envisaging a federation never came into being owing to the reluctance of the Princes who, having first agreed to it in the Round Table Conference, now recoiled from the idea of permitting the federal authority to exercise those minimum powers in their States which are essential to the working of a federation. It thus speaks volumes for the compromising attitude of the Congress that, though committed to complete independence it, nevertheless, decided to give this unsatisfactory constitutional scheme a trial by working the Provincial Autonomy thereby abjuring extra-constitutional and revolutionary methods for the time being. In the elections which followed, it was returned to power in seven provinces thereby vindicating its claim to be the most popular political party in the country.

THE VICEROY'S PROCLAMATION

It was natural therefore that the Viceroy's Proclamation of 3 September 1939 announcing that war had broken out with Germany and a state of emergency existed in India, meaning that India was a party to the war, was resented by the Congress and all nationalists who felt that India had been "dragged into the war". The people's representatives had not even been sounded, to say nothing of being consulted. The Congress leaders were not so naive as to expect or claim the constitutional right to decide whether India should or should not enter the war. But in view of their party's position as the premier political organisation it would have been a statesmanlike move if, before issuing the Proclamation, the Viceroy had apprised them of it and expressed the hope that they would cooperate. Considering the abhorrence in which the Fascist powers were held by the Congress and other parties, it is certain that the gesture would have been appreciated and would have evoked a sympathetic response. But this was not to be and the fact of India having been automatically brought into the war by virtue of the Viceroy's proclamation was considered humiliating by all nationalists.

Though all parties were united in their condemnation of the Fascist powers they differed as to how and under what conditions help was to be given to the so-called democracies in defeating them. These various views and shades of public opinion are considered below.

THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

Before the war : As the war clouds were gathering in Europe, some steps to meet the crisis had been taken in India. Some Indian troops had been despatched to Aden in April 1939 and a Bill was introduced in the British Parliament which among other things was intended to strengthen the powers of the Central Government in India. The Congress had disapproved of both these measures because it was opposed to the employment of Indian troops abroad for 'imperialist purpose' and because it thought that strengthening the Central Government would undermine the authority of the Provincial Governments who had been given autonomy hardly two years ago. Later when more regiments of the Indian Army were ordered to be sent abroad—to Singapore and Egypt—the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution in August denouncing British foreign policy which was likely to get India entangled in a war against the declared will of the people. The Congress argument at this time, and later repeatedly affirmed, was that India could not fight for freedom unless she herself was free. The Working Committee therefore directed the Congress members of the Central Legislative Assembly at Delhi to boycott the next session, and warned the Provincial Governments to "assist in no way the war preparations" and be prepared to resign. This was less than a month before the war broke out.

On the outbreak of War : Yet, so great was the hatred for Nazi ideology that on the outbreak of war, Nehru, the leading light of the Congress

next only to Gandhi, while returning from China after visiting Chiang Kai-shek, told Press correspondents at Rangoon: "This is no time to bargain. We are against the rising imperialism of Germany, Italy and Japan and for the decaying imperialism of Europe".

DEMAND FOR DECLARATION OF WAR AIMS—15 SEPTEMBER

However, on reaching India he found that the opinion among Congressmen was divided and many believed in the sentiment so pithily expressed by Subhas Chandra Bose—the erstwhile Congressman, who had earlier been forced to resign the Presidentship of the Congress, that "British adversity was India's opportunity". Thus the Congress leadership was faced with a dilemma: on the one hand it passionately desired the defeat of Nazism, on the other it was equally if not more passionately opposed to British imperialism which was keeping India in subjection and treating the country as a dependent colony as evidenced by its latest act of proclaiming India at war. Gandhi's astuteness resolved the dilemma. Under his inspiration the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution on 15 September which, while making a bitter attack on Fascism, demanded a declaration of the "war aims" of the democracies. The idea clearly was that if the war aims included independence for India, the Congress would be able to carry the country with it in support of the war effort.

The Congress stand has been criticised on two grounds:

- (1) that it was a bargaining attitude not consistent with the political morality of the type preached by Gandhi, and
- (2) that committed as it was to the ethics of non-violence, the Congress could have offered, at best, only moral support to the war.

BARGAINING

As regards the first criticism, it can be admitted at once that the Congress was bargaining. The opinion among Congressmen, both rank and file, who were familiar with and who had been frustrated by British dilatory tactics in the shape of commissions, discussions, conferences, select-committees etc. during the period between the two wars, was overwhelmingly in favour of obtaining a definite commitment from the British Government despite Gandhi's own dislike for a bargain.

It may be that this bargaining attitude did not seem quite consistent with the high moral standards to which Gandhi had been trying to raise politics in India, but its criticism on this score, coming from western diplomats and politicians does not hold water. After all, what are negotiations if not bargaining? All international agreements and treaties are based on a spirit of give and take and it seems hardly fair to look down upon the desire to achieve one's freedom by a bargain.

MORAL OR ACTIVE HELP

The second criticism is equally invalid and is not based on a correct evaluation of the mind of the Congress. Though some theoreticians in the Congress considered that it was not quite consistent with the policy of non-violence to participate in a war, there were others more practically minded, and they constituted a formidable group in the party, who hated totalitarianism to such an extent that they were willing to fight actively against it. But even this group felt that in order to enthuse the masses in favour of the war, it would be necessary to show to them that the country would be benefited in some way as a result of their sacrifices. This they could do only if there was a categorical declaration from the British Government regarding its war aims. Thus their dilemma, if any, arose not from any theoretical or ideological conflict between violence and non-violence, but from the practical consideration of how best to harness public opinion for a cause.

NON-VIOLENCE AND PACIFISM

The Congress view, particularly as represented by Nehru, had always made a distinction between non-violence and pacifism. To Nehru pacifism seemed a foolish doctrine as it implied surrender to evil and therefore an invitation to the aggressor, whereas the very basis of the theory of non-violence was resistance to the aggressor. He was of the view that the Czechs should have resisted Hitler militarily in 1938. There is no doubt that if the British Government had immediately given a definite promise of Dominion Status or independence at the end of the war, Nehru would have been able to persuade Gandhi and the Congress to offer all kinds of support in the war effort.

NOW OR LATER?

Another point on which the Congress resolution was misunderstood, perhaps deliberately, hinged around the word "immediate" occurring in it. The Congress had asked that India be *declared* independent, not *made* independent immediately. While Gandhi's philosophy of *Satyagraha* lays down that there should be no surrender on essentials, it also definitely favours compromise on details. In this case the essential point was the unambiguous declaration of independence in principle, while the detail on which compromise was possible was the time and date for giving effect to it fully. This was clarified by the A.I.C.C. resolution of 10 October which said: "India must be declared an independent nation and present application given to this status to the largest possible extent". As Coupland states: "In view of developments in the course of the next three years, it should be observed that at this time the Congress 'High Command' was apparently not asking for *complete* independence immediately, but only for as much of it as might be *possible*". Something had to be done immediately as a token of good faith.

THE BRITISH RESPONSE—17 OCTOBER

The Viceroy's statement of 17 October, issued after interviewing leaders of public opinion belonging to all parties pointed out that the British Government *had not yet defined their war aims* but Britain desired the establishment of a better international system and a real lasting peace.

As regards the constitutional position in India, the statement said that the scheme of 1935 would be open to "modification" at the end of the war after giving full weight to the views of minorities, that Dominion Status was still the goal of British policy in India but that any more clear indication of British purpose could not be given in view of the existing "world politics and of political realities in this country". *The political realities* was of course a reference to differences in India mainly between the Congress and the Muslim League.

For the present, the only step suggested was the establishment of a consultative group representing political parties and Indian princes over which the Viceroy himself would preside!

DISAPPOINTING STATEMENT

Nothing could be more disappointing to nationalist public opinion than this statement. Instead of an unambiguous definition of Britain's war aims, it merely referred vaguely to some better future and lasting peace. Such platitudes from British statesmen were well-known to Indian nationalists who regarded them as nothing more than clever devices for evading the real issue. Moreover, the statement also contained that argument—namely the interests and rights of minorities—which was later fostered and nurtured during the war years to grow into a full-fledged excuse not only for denying the Congress demand but also ultimately for dividing the country on communal basis.

CONGRESS REACTION : RESOLUTION OF 22 OCTOBER

According to Gandhi, the Viceroy's statement showed that there was to be no democracy in India if Britain could prevent it. The Congress Working Committee which considered the statement on 22 October rejected it completely. As this decision marks the beginning of open conflict between the Congress and the Government, it is given below in the words of the CWC's resolution itself:—

"The Viceroy's statement is an unequivocal reiteration of the old imperialist policy. The Committee regards the mention of differences amongst the several parties as a screen to hide the true intentions of Great Britain. The Congress has always stood for the amplest guarantee of the rights of the minorities. The freedom the Congress claimed was not for the Congress or any particular group or community but for the nation and all communities in India that go to build that nation.

The only way to establish this freedom and to ascertain the will of the nation as a whole is through a democratic process which gives full opportunity to all. The Committee must therefore regard the Viceroy's statement as in every way unfortunate. In the circumstances it cannot possibly give any support to Great Britain, for it would amount to an endorsement of the imperialist policy which the Congress has always sought to end. As a first step in this direction the Committee calls upon the Congress Ministries to tender their resignations."

CONFLICT BEGINS

Though some of the Congress ministers were reluctant to resign, discipline was maintained and beginning with the Madras ministry on 27 October, all the Congress ministries had resigned by 15 November after getting resolutions passed through the respective legislatures re-affirming the Congress policy. The programme of social reform and cooperation with Government in a constitutional manner begun in 1937 thus came to an abrupt end. The Congress was again on the war path.

THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

The mutually antagonistic views of the League and the Congress had been accentuated after the sweeping victories of the Congress at the polls in 1937. The League had then wanted to form coalitions with the Congress in some provinces but the latter had spurned the suggestion. There may be some truth in the charge that the Congress was intoxicated with victory, but on the other hand the Congress could claim with a fair amount of justification that it had proved its right to be considered the only nationalist, secular and democratic party representing the whole of India. While the Muslim League, as its name implied, was an organisation of the Muslims only, the door of the Congress was open to all Indians who subscribed to its policy. It had many Muslims as its active members, as office holders in different echelons of the organisation and it had had even Muslim Presidents in the past. The Congress, therefore, while admitting the League to be an important organisation of the Muslim community refused to accept its claim to be the sole representative of all Indian Muslims. If the Muslims of the League wanted to share fully in the enjoyment of *Swaraj* (independence) when it came, they could join the Congress now and cooperate with it in achieving the objective.

This attitude of the Congress, though it seemed natural for a secular body at that time, was fraught with serious consequences. It completed the polarisation between the Congress and the Muslim League, whose President, Mr. Jinnah, began to dub the Congress as a Hindu body in whose hands the interests of the Muslim were not safe. A spectre of the tyranny of the majority was raised before the Muslims. The demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims can thus be seen to be more clearly and definitely marked from this time.

JINNAH'S OPPORTUNITY

The war was to provide Jinnah with his opportunity. If the Congress would not recognise him, he would get recognition from the British, but he would have to play his cards skilfully, and disclose his hand only at the right time. On 28 August, six days before the war, the Working Committee of the Muslim League had declared that it was premature to determine the attitude of the Muslims in the event of a war breaking out. But on the declaration of war, the Punjab and Bengal Ministries, headed by Muslim Premiers and backed by their legislatures promised full support to Britain. The Muslim Premier of Sind who had not supported the League in other matters, also followed suit. But the official policy of the League's High Command was not available for some time.

When however the League did come out with a resolution on 18 September, three days *after* the Congress resolution, it showed that the League too was out to bargain. After condemning the Nazi aggression and expressing sympathy with Poland, Britain and France it laid down two conditions on which whole-hearted Muslim support could be given. These were, firstly, that Muslim interests should be safeguarded in the Congress provinces and, secondly, that no constitutional changes in India should be introduced without the approval of the Muslim League which was the only organisation competent to speak for the Muslims of India.

It said nothing about either approving or disapproving the action of the three Muslim Premiers of Bengal, Punjab and Sind who had declared their unconditional support of Britain in war.

This was a clever move, for it gave a proof of the League's desire to help the British by its tacit approval of the Muslim Premiers' action and at the same time kept the door open for negotiations to extort consent to its demand. This attitude suited the British Government also whose response came in the Viceroy's declaration of 17 October which promised, *inter alia*, full weight to be given to the views and interests of the minorities, and to revise the 1935 Constitution.

The Muslim League's reaction to the statement was again realistic: it neither completely rejected nor completely accepted the declaration as a basis for cooperation. While approving of the Viceroy's assurance regarding protection of minorities, it criticised the idea of *revising* the constitution—it wanted the constitution to be scrapped and the whole constitutional question considered *de novo*. It asked for further clarification and discussion on certain points. This was the position by the end of October 1939—a deadlock seemed to have been reached in so far as the two main political parties were concerned.

VICEROY TRIES AGAIN

The Viceroy was, however, keen to see that India's great potential in money, troops and supplies should be fully exploited for the war. This could

be done only if he could hammer out some sort of agreement with the political parties and particularly with the Congress. So he made another effort in November to resolve the deadlock. He was prepared to go a little further—something more than a mere consultative body at the centre. But the Congress would have nothing short of a clear declaration on the lines of its resolutions of September and October. So the resolutions of the Congress Working Committee meetings held in November and December, reaffirmed its policy and implied that the Viceroy's efforts to bring about an agreement were not sincere since he was dragging in the communal question and the problem of the Princes to delay matters and "cloud the main issue". The Congress considered that once India was declared free and a Constituent Assembly convened to frame its constitution, all these difficulties could be solved in a democratic way. The Muslim League declared its firm opposition to the idea of a Constituent Assembly on the ground that the Assembly would be dominated and controlled by the Congress and the Hindus and that Muslim interests would be sacrificed.

OTHER PARTIES

The National Liberal Federation and the Hindu Mahasabha also held their meetings in December. Though both desired their followers to help in the war effort, the liberals were concerned more with the constitutional problem and the Mahasabha with the threat to peace and unity of India posed by the Muslim League's communal policy and the beginnings of the two-nation theory.

POSITION AT THE CLOSE OF 1939

Thus the position at the end of 1939 may be summed up as follows:

- (1) The Congress, failing to get an unequivocal declaration of independence and considering the Viceroy's emphasis on minorities' rights as an excuse for denying the transfer of power to Indian hands, was on the war path—for which the first step, the resignation of Congress Ministries and legislators, had been taken.
- (2) The Muslim League, taking the situation as an excellent opportunity for strengthening its position with the British Government as well as the Muslim masses, was harping on minority rights. This was bringing about a polarisation of opinion between itself and what it called the 'Hindu' Congress.
- (3) The Hindu Mahasabha was for supporting the war effort and exhorted the Hindus to enlist in the armed forces in as large numbers as possible. This was not out of any love for the British or their allies but from the desire to see Hindu youth get military training and experience so as to be able to defend the country when India became free. The British Government's policy of recruitment to India's armed forces was based on the distinction

between the so-called 'martial' and 'non-martial' classes under which large sections of the Hindus had been classified non-martial and thereby denied the chance of adopting a military career. The Hindu Mahasabha saw in the war a good opportunity of getting this discriminatory rule annulled.

WAR SITUATION

Meanwhile, Europe was passing through what has been described as the period of the "phoney war". The magnitude of the danger to the Allies which was to become apparent in the spring of the new year was not realised at this time and the urgency of a settlement with India was not brought home to the British Government. The flow of men and material in India for the war was consequently slow but nevertheless steady.

THE SECOND YEAR

In the beginning of 1940, the Viceroy again made a policy statement in a luncheon speech at the Orient Club in Bombay on 10 January. In this he declared that Dominion Status of the Westminster variety was the objective of the British Government for India, but it could be introduced only after the war. In the meanwhile, he offered to enlarge his Executive Council by the inclusion of some Indian political leaders "as an immediate earnest of their (British Government's) intention". The good faith and sincerity of His Majesty's Government could not be questioned, he said, but problems of this magnitude could not be solved swiftly. He was however prepared to consider any practical suggestion "that has general support."

In February he met Gandhi to explain this policy and though they 'parted as friends' Gandhi said that a settlement with the British Government was not possible unless India was allowed to frame her own constitution. The Congress position was again stated in its session on 14 March at Ramgarh. The main points made here were (i) that Britain was carrying on the war for imperialist ends and therefore the Congress could not be a party to it, (ii) that the people of India alone could frame a constitution through a constituent assembly based on adult franchise, (iii) that the rights of all recognised minorities would be protected by agreement or arbitration and (iv) that the rulers of the princely states or any foreign vested interests should not be allowed to restrict the sovereignty of the Indian people.

The Viceroy was in a difficult position—on the one hand he wanted to carry the Congress with him in support of the war effort and on the other he was not in a position to introduce radical changes during the war. The British Government was sincere in its proclaimed determination to give Dominion Status at the end of the war (as documents published after the war revealed) but it is a tragic fact of history that the Viceroy failed completely to convey this determination to the Indian leaders and the public. A perusal of the second volume of the "Transfer of Power in India" (Published by

Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971) makes this fact abundantly clear. As Maurice Zinkin remarks in his review of the book in *The Times*:

"Perhaps the only man who believed them (the British Govt.) was Jinnah. Perhaps that was why, in the end, Jinnah got more of his way than anybody else. Had the Congress believed that the British Government was sincere in its intentions to give up power its reaction might have been more willing to compromise".

Muslim League : Having seen that there was not likely to be any compromise between the Congress and the Government the Muslim League began to declare its demand in more clear terms than ever before. In an article in *Time and Tide* on 13 February Mr. Jinnah stated that the League was not opposed to freedom for India but was opposed only to the rule of the majority community. In India there was not one nation but two, "both of them must share in the governance of their common motherland". Twelve days later on 25 February the League Council meeting went a step further. It declared that the Viceroy's assurance that any settlement which ignored Muslims would be unthinkable, was not enough. It demanded that Muslims should be the 'sole judges of their destiny.'

Having failed to do business with the Congress, the Viceroy now invited Jinnah for a conference on 13 March. In this meeting a bargain was struck; while Jinnah assured the Viceroy that Muslims would do nothing to retard the war effort, the Viceroy promised to convey his (Jinnah's) views to London, namely, *no settlement with Congress without previous consent of Muslims*.

Encouraged by this promise, amounting virtually to a veto on Congress demand, Jinnah went further still at the League session on 23 March and had the League pass the famous resolution for a separate state for the Muslims.

THE PAKISTAN RESOLUTION

In this resolution the basic principle for framing a new constitution was stated to be that "geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones, should be grouped to constitute independent *states*, in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign".

The resolution is significant for three points—the word *Pakistan* was not used, no reference was made to the issue of war and lastly there were to be more than one independent Muslim *states* and not *a state*. The omission to mention war was deliberate as it, by implication, left the Muslims free to support the war effort, which in fact they were doing. If the real intent of this resolution had been followed in 1947, the so-called two nation theory

would have resulted in the creation of three independent states—India and two separate independent Muslim States in north western and eastern zones respectively.

The attitude of the other parties and organisations and the extent to which they reflected “public opinion” may be summarised below:

INDIAN COMMUNISTS

The Communist Party of India and some of their subsidiary organisations having been declared illegal in 1934, were in a state of obscurity for some time. But by 1939 they were emerging from this condition by penetrating into the Congress with the idea of using its platform for furthering their own views and policies. Originally opposed to the Congress, they now supported the ‘national reformist bourgeoisie’ for it was at least anti-Imperialist. This strategy paid dividends and when the war broke out the Indian communists were in a position of better strength than in 1934.

Their membership was small, but in addition to infiltrating into the Congress those of them who were not in jail had teamed up with other radical groups like the Forward Block of Subhas Bose and the Congress Socialists. They were also active in the various labour unions and peasant organisations.

Getting inspiration from the British Communists like Palme Dutt and Harry Pollit, they condemned the war as having been brought on by the British Government’s policy of appeasement of Hitler and the Fascists. Their policy, more ‘left’ even than that of the International Communist leadership at this stage (early 1940), was to grab the opportunity provided by the war to turn it into a “war of national liberation”. But their efforts in March 1940 to have the Ramgarh session of the Congress vote for “immediate launching of the struggle”, through an amendment of the main resolution failed—even the Congress socialists opposed them. Thus when they organised a strike in the textile industry, they were not supported by any influential party and the Government was able to suppress the movement easily, arresting all known communists and other leftists under the Defence of India Rules “for interfering in the efficient prosecution of the war”. The Communists blamed the Congress for manoeuvring for a suitable compromise with the British. Their arrests continued and having made no preparation for an underground existence they found themselves completely crippled. Their opportunity to be in the Indian political picture again, was, however, to come in the middle of 1941 with Hitler’s attack on Russia when the hitherto ‘imperialist’ war became overnight a people’s war for the Communists all over the world. After this date, the Indian Communists offered their help, for whatever it was worth, to the Government in its war effort, though the latter took some time before its distrust of the communists was sufficiently removed to enable it to release the imprisoned communists.

ALL INDIA FORWARD BLOCK

The party most violently opposed to compromise, constitutionalism, and any form of support to the British in the war, was the Forward Block of Subhas Chandra Bose, formed in 1939 after his break with the Congress. In its second session at Nagpur on 18 June, the party was for continuing the struggle for freedom of the country and for utilising "the opportunity presented by international events" for this purpose. Their rallying cry was "*all power to the Indian people*". They demanded the immediate transfer of power to the Indian people through a Provisional National Government for the establishment of which the British Parliament could pass an Act "in twenty-four hours". This Provisional National Government could later convene a Constituent Assembly, when things settled down, to frame a full-fledged Constitution. For the transitional period a "Citizens' Defence Corps"—a private body not connected with the Government—was to be formed for internal defence.

HINDUS

The Hindus formed the majority community of the country, but no single organisation could claim to reflect their opinion. Hindus could be found in the Congress which claimed to be secular and to represent all Indians, there were Hindus who were socialists and communists, there were Hindus of liberal views, there were Hindus among the extremists and leftists, as well as among the rightists. There was however one political organisation of the Hindus, the All India Hindu Mahasabha, which had risen to importance as a reaction to the growing Muslim attitude of extorting privileges and special rights since 1909, an attitude which was now leading to a division of the country. Hindu Mahasabha, led at this time by men like V.D. Savarkar, Dr. Moonje, Bhai Parmanand etc., represented Hindu nationalism as well as Hindu communalism as opposed to the Muslim communalism. Though a majority in the country as a whole the Hindus were in a minority in the Punjab, Sind and Bengal and were thus in fear of being dominated by a hostile community if those provinces became autonomous or independent. This factor can easily explain the Mahasabha's attitude to war, to the British Government and to the demand for Pakistan.

The resolutions passed by the All India Hindu Mahasabha in its Working Committee meetings or conferences in the first half of 1940, therefore, condemned the Pakistan scheme vehemently and laid down:

- (i) that the Mahasabha was prepared to help in the war effort in a spirit of responsive cooperation;
- (ii) that measures to give military training to Indians should be stepped up;
- (iii) that a declaration promising Dominion Status to India immediately on the cessation of war should be made;
- (iv) that the federal scheme was the quickest way to Dominion Status; and finally

- (v) that no agreement between Congress and Muslim League would be acceptable to Hindus unless approved by the Mahasabha.

The Hindu Mahasabha conferences in the Provinces passed resolutions in similar strain.

THE SIKHS

The Sikhs having a large stake in the Punjab were a community of confirmed warriors as also confirmed nationalists. While wanting independence for the country, their emphasis was on condemning the idea of Pakistan. The All India Akali Party, with Master Tara Singh at the helm, supported the Congress demand for independence, urged the government to give military training to the youth of the country on a large scale and declared their determination to resist the Pakistan demand by "all possible means".

The Khalsa National Party led by a Knight, Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, while saying nothing about the war, for the obvious reason that many Sikhs were joining the army, went so far as to assert that if the Pakistan demand was pressed, the Sikhs would "claim back the sovereignty of the Punjab which was only held as a trust by the British during the minority regime of Maharaja Dalip Singh." Other Sikh organisations held more or less similar views, viz., not withholding war aid but opposing the Pakistan idea.

THE PRINCES

The British Government in India was, however, not without staunch and loyal friends in the country. While other parties were bargaining and offering conditional support or responsive cooperation, the princes saw in the war an opportunity to get out of their commitments regarding joining an all-India federal system which would naturally result in some surrender of power on their part. In the annual session of the Chamber of Princes held in New Delhi on 11 March 1940, they passed a resolution in which they expressed "firm determination to render every possible assistance in men, money and material to His Imperial Majesty and his government in their heroic struggle for upholding the cause of justice——." They criticised the Congress and offered their voluntary and spontaneous help to Britain unlike those who were "out to bargain and barter or who were given to bluff and bluster".

How little they represented the public opinion in their states was made clear by the All India States Peoples' Conference which repudiated the Princes' claim to speak on behalf of their peoples. The Conference pointed out the incongruity of the rulers expressing support for democracy in Europe while maintaining "undiluted autocracy in their own states".

THE LIBERALS

The leadership of the National Liberal Federation of India consisted mainly of knighted and titled persons, moneyed men of business and vested interests who were traditionally supporters of the status quo and opposed to any radical changes. Their following was numerically weak. The Council

of the Federation met in Bombay on 18 February 1940, under the Presidentship of Dr. Paranjpye. Others present included Sir Chimanlal Setalwad, Sir Cowas Jehangir, Rao Sahib Vaidya and others of the same ilk. They passed a long resolution which, shorn of typical liberal verbiage and jargon, may be summed up as under:—

Welcomed the Viceroy's declaration about Dominion Status after the war, dubbed the Congress demand for constituent assembly on adult franchise and independence as impracticable. Repudiated the two-nation theory of Muslim League. Demanded enlargement of the Viceroy's Executive Council, Indianisation and enlargement of the armed forces, and encouragement of industries connected to war purposes. Called for convening a small conference of about 150 people as a preliminary to a large conference later to lay down the principles for the future constitution of India.

Again meeting in June 1940 at Poona, the Federation called upon all parties to sink their differences in view of the "intensely critical situation caused by the entry of Italy in the war" so as to ensure the "full cooperation of India in the prosecution of the war". Demanded the expansion of armed forces and the appointment of an Indian defence minister.

MISCELLANEOUS OTHER ORGANISATIONS

In addition to the above mentioned main parties, there were many other organisations and groups who considered the war as against the interests of the people, and as an opportunity for gaining freedom for India. Among these may be mentioned, the All India Students' Federation, U.P. Students' Conference, the All India Anti-Corruption Conference (Communist dominated), the All-India Akali Conference etc. etc. Some of these influenced by Subhas Chandra Bose or some other leftist leaders were opposed to the compromising attitude of the Congress, while some assured the Congress of their support in a struggle for independence, but most of these were anti-British, anti-war, and anti-Pakistan movement.

This position, a stalemate with the Congress, an understanding with the Muslim League, and offers of support and different suggestions from various parties, remained unchanged for a few months till the German offensive on the Western front and the fall of France. The disaster which had overtaken the Allies and its likely consequences had their repercussions not only on the attitude of the British Government in India but also on the political parties and public opinion in the country.

CRIPPS MISSION

Although the Viceroy and the bureaucracy were satisfied that India was putting in the maximum war effort, Whitehall, concerned about American criticism, authorised Linlithgow to enlarge his Executive Council in a bid to win popular support. Eight Indians and four Britons were appointed

to the new Council, the "natives" outnumbering the whites for the first time. But the gesture was lost when Churchill dashed all hopes roused by the Atlantic Charter by his statement in the Commons that the Charter did not apply to India. Nationalist India reacted angrily and Gandhi firmly refused to approve an earlier proposal by a section of the Congress leaders, who had come out of jail at the end of their term, that they should resume ministerial responsibility.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 brought the U.S. into the war and quickened the pace of political developments. It also gave a fillip to American anxiety for a settlement with India.

In 1942, Chiang Kai-shek and his wife visited India in February to urge the Indian leaders to support the war effort against Japan. They met Gandhi in Calcutta and at the end of the visit Chiang Kai-shek issued a statement supporting the Indian demand for independence. It was, however, not released for broadcast in India until the Viceroy had been sounded and had agreed to allow its publication. It caused a great furore when Madame Chiang, in Delhi, said that the Americans were fully behind the Indian demand, that their visit would strengthen the hands of President Roosevelt in putting pressure on Churchill to change his attitude on India. She added that Lord Halifax was exerting pressure from Washington and that Churchill would have to yield.

Not long after the Japanese entered Singapore and Rangoon had fallen. The situation appeared ominous and the urgency of a settlement with India was felt more than ever before. The British Government decided to send Sir Stafford Cripps, a Cabinet minister, to India. It was no secret to anyone that another effort for reconciliation with India was going to be made under the stress of circumstances. Now that America was also at war, Roosevelt wanted to make sure that the Mission was handled properly and therefore sent his own personal envoy, Col Louis Johnson, to Delhi in April 1942. The Cripps' proposals promised Dominion Status and a constitution making body *at the end of the war*. Provision was to be made for the participation of the Indian (Princely) states and the constitution so framed was to be accepted by the British subject to a treaty for the protection of racial and religious minorities *and the right of any province to opt out of the new State*. Britain meanwhile was to retain control and direction of the defence of India as part of their global war strategy, "but the task of organising the full military, moral and material resources of India was to be with the cooperation of the peoples of India."

As can be seen easily, these proposals implied no vital immediate change. Gandhi therefore declared that at best they amounted to a "post-dated cheque on a crashing bank". He held the view that if the Japanese invasion was to be met, the British must immediately transfer power so that an Indian Government could take control of the machinery of administra-

tion. This would enthuse the people in favour of the war. The Congress rejected the Cripps' offer for it was only a promise, and the Muslim League rejected it for the reason that parliamentary government ("counting of heads", as Jinnah called it) was not suitable for India.

Meanwhile the war situation was becoming increasingly desperate. Japanese ships appeared in the Bay of Bengal and the retreat of British-Indian forces northwards of Rangoon was in progress. Though it was not a rout but an organised withdrawal marked by gallant rearguard actions the outcome was not in doubt and the invasion of India through its north-eastern borders with Burma was a distinct probability.

C. R. ACCEPTS PAKISTAN

Realising this danger certain segments of public opinion in India including those in the Congress were keen on a settlement with the Government to enable them to render effective support to the administration in its war effort. The Congress members of the Madras legislature, therefore, led by C. Rajagopalachari (affectionately known as C.R.) passed a resolution recommending that the League's claim for separation be accepted and negotiations with it for a national government started to meet the expected invasion. This further strengthened, at least morally, the hands of Jinnah.

However, within a week, the All India Congress Committee met at Allahabad and discountenanced the Madras resolution by a large majority. Instead, it passed one of its own, emphasising the unity of India and calling for non-cooperation with and non-violent resistance to the invader. The Cripps Mission's offer was thus rejected by Congress and later by the Muslim League also.

FAILURE OF CRIPPS MISSION

The failure of the Cripps Mission, curious as it might seem, did not gladden the hearts of the Tory diehards. Relief that no interim national government was possible in India was temporary, and was quickly swamped by the conviction that this "jewel of the British Empire" was lost. Striking evidence of the feeling then prevalent in the ruling circles in Britain is afforded by a note in the diary of King George VI recorded after one of his Tuesday luncheons with Churchill in July 1942:

"He amazed me by saying that his colleagues and both, or all three, parties in Parliament were quite prepared to give up India to the Indians after the war. He felt they had already been talked into giving up India. Cripps, the Press and U.S. public opinion have all contributed to make their minds up that our rule in India is wrong, and had always been wrong for India. I disagree and have always said India has got to be governed, and this will have to be our policy". (*King George VI—His Life and Reign*, by John W. Wheeler-Bennett).

The political situation was clearly developing into a triangular contest. The Congress still laboured under the sincere but mistaken belief that

it could cope with Jinnah's intransigence if it succeeded in striking a deal with the British. The Cripps' proposals had conceded the principle of partition and Gandhi therefore left Delhi in a fit of disgust. The Congress Working Committee adopted a resolution expressing regret that the proposals "gravely imperil the development of a free and united national government and the establishment of a democratic state."

CONGRESS ACCEPTS PAKISTAN

"Nevertheless", the resolution went on to say, "the Committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people of any territorial unit to remain in the Indian Union against their declared and established will". This resolution, drafted by Nehru, ironically, accepted by implication the novel principle of yielding to the provinces the right to secede or not to accede to the federation if they so chose. The partition in principle had been accepted! Jinnah rightly and exultingly declared that he had won his battle for Pakistan. The idea which had first been put forth at the time of the Round Table Conference by some young Muslims in England 10 years earlier and had been then proclaimed "chimerical and impracticable" was now definitely within the realm of practical politics.

The League executive almost simultaneously passed a resolution expressing "gratification that the possibility of Pakistan is recognised by implication by providing for the establishment of two or more unions in India" and rejecting the Cripps' proposals for the reason already mentioned.'

Reluctant to alienate American sympathy, however, the Congress adopted another resolution on 14 July 1942, stating that it would "change the present ill-will against Britain into goodwill and make India a willing partner in a joint enterprise of securing freedom for the nations and people of the world" and that this was only possible "if India feels the glow of freedom". It added: "The Congress is, therefore, agreeable to the stationing of the armed forces of the Allies in India, should they so desire, in order to ward off and resist Japanese or other aggression and to protect and help China". But the 'glow of freedom' was not to appear, as the India Office and the Viceroy were now agreed on building up Jinnah as the crescent card to neutralise the Congress challenge. The challenge was not far in coming. Having realised that all their hopes for a settlement *during* the war were frustrated, the AICC met at Bombay and decided upon the Quit India Movement on 8 August 1942, which was to be a mass non-violent struggle. The Government acted promptly and within a few hours of the passing of the resolution, all Congress leaders were taken in custody before dawn on 9 August and the Congress declared an illegal organisation.

QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT

Bereft of effective leadership, the agitation was carried on by underground workers and quickly turned into a chaotic and at places violent battle with authority. The entry into the ranks of the non-violent freedom fighters of the extremists, terrorists and anti-social elements led to alarming distur-

bances all over the country. Communications were disrupted, much public property was destroyed indiscriminately and the war effort was impeded considerably. The situation in Bihar, some Maharashtra areas of Bombay province and eastern regions of the U.P. was particularly grim. Communications with Bengal and Assam were paralysed and the supply of war material to the forces defending India on the eastern border was placed in great jeopardy. But the stern measures taken by the Government succeeded in breaking the back of the struggle by the end of September.

But Jinnah seemed to go from strength to strength. Back from a League session in April 1943, glowing with pride, he said that now indeed his claim that the League was the sole representative of the Muslims of India had been vindicated, for three of the four Muslim-majority provinces were being governed by League Ministers. The Muslims and the Princes were already supporting the war effort and with the Congress out of the way other elements also cooperated largely because the increased tempo of recruitment was providing job opportunities for educated as well as semi-educated young men of all classes. By this time news of Allied offensives in Africa and elsewhere were coming in, converging Soviet attacks had cut off the German Sixth Army around Stalingrad in November 1942, and preparations to oust the Japanese were briskly going ahead with India as the base.

COMMUNISTS ATTITUDE

Since June 1941, after the invasion of the USSR by Hitler the communist tactics all over the world was to subordinate everything to the sole aim of saving Russia and working for its victory. The Indian communists had, however no idea of this new line of policy for some time for they were either underground or in jails. Only after some communist papers and other literature was 'smuggled' (with the connivance of the authorities) and reached the Indian communists in jail and outside that they were finally converted to the 'Peoples War' thesis by December 1941. Their openly expressed slogan now was "make the Indian people play a people's role in the People's War". The Government after being fully convinced of this change of heart, responded by releasing all communist prisoners and declared the CPI (Communist Party of India) a legal body in July 1942, and got their support for the war for whatever it was worth.

Owing to all these factors, the Congress was virtually isolated and the public opinion in India, by and large, became reconciled to waiting for Allied victory, and all effective hostility to the war effort was almost completely at an end.

INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY (INA)

Thus, though by the beginning of 1943, the internal situation in India was, from the Government's point of view, as satisfactory as possible under the circumstances, a new danger seemed to appear on the Burma front. Subhas Chander Bose, a consistent opponent of the British rule in India,

having escaped from the country in 1941 had reached Malaya via Germany and Japan. Under an agreement with the Japanese and with their help and cooperation he formed a Government of Free India at Singapore and organised an Indian National Army getting recruits from the large number of officers and men of the Indian army who had become prisoners of war on the unconditional surrender of the Allied forces to the Japanese at Singapore in February 1942. Any news of the romantic escape and exploits of Bose (now known as Netaji or leader) which were allowed to trickle into India thrilled the people and made them proud that a great and brave son of India was fighting the battle of his country's freedom abroad. (The leader of an earlier, INA, 'General' Mohan Singh, had been imprisoned by the Japanese before Bose's arrival). Netaji's name became a legend in India in spite of the fact that the public, by and large, was sceptical about his success which was necessarily linked with the military fortunes of the Japanese. The Government of India, too, was not unduly worried about the military implications of the INA, though they were concerned about the possible effect on the morale of Indian soldiers at the prospect of having to fight for the British against their ex-comrades at arms fighting in the name of a Government of Free India.

However, the war effort in India continued at an increasing tempo and by 1944 about two and a half million Indians were serving in the armed forces as compared to only one-fifth of a million in 1939. The developments in India after this have very little to do with public opinion on war as they were mainly concerned with questions of constitutional changes expected at the end of the war. These can be briefly stated to bring the story up to the partition of India on 15 August 1947.

THE END

Gandhi was released unconditionally on 6 May 1944. In a press interview, Gandhi said in July that what he asked now was different from what he had wanted in 1942. He would now be satisfied with nothing less than a national government in full control of the civil administration.

A couple of days after this interview was published, a journalist (Durga Dass) wrote in the Hindustan Times a piece entitled: "Conspiracy Between British Diehards and Jinnah". This was based on a talk with a top Britisher who had said to him: "Mr. Jinnah will never come to an agreement during the war. While he is intransigent, he is on top; the moment he settles with the Congress, the latter will be on top. Mr. Jinnah's intransigence suits us, and if he maintains his attitude and keeps his hands off the Punjab, which is our special preserve, he will deserve some support at the end of the war".

While Indian politicians were pinning hopes on intervention by the U.S. President, Rajagopalachari (C.R.) convinced Gandhi that he should take up the threads of the negotiations with Jinnah where C.R. had left them. The Gandhi-Jinnah talks in Bombay in September 1944, lasting well over a fortnight proved abortive. Jinnah poured scorn on Gandhi's formula,

which envisaged an all-India central authority. "What I am being offered is a truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan", he exclaimed indignantly.

Jinnah came out jubilant from the parleys. "Gandhi has defined Pakistan for me," he said. "Gandhi asked me whether it would be a state whose policy on defence and external affairs could be in conflict with India's. I had only to answer 'yes'."

In an imaginative and statesmanlike move to lift the clouds darkening the political horizon, Wavell who had succeeded Linlithgow as Viceroy in March 43 proceeded to London in March 1945 for consultations with Whitehall. On his return he made his fateful announcement on reconstituting his Executive Council in June. Jinnah spurned the Wavell plan although it had given parity to the League with the Congress. He remarked, "Am I a fool to accept this when I am offered Pakistan on a platter?" The Congress was also not agreeable as in the proposed new Executive Council the Viceroy and the C-in-C were still to be non-Indians.

CABINET MISSION

After the war, when the Labour Government came into power in Britain, it ordered fresh elections to be held in India. The Congress won sweeping victories for the General seats and the League for the Muslim seats. A Cabinet Mission was sent to India in March 1946 and complete independence declared as a possible goal if the Indians so desired. As no agreement could be reached between the Congress and the League, the Cabinet Mission gave its own recommendation for a federal government for the whole of India including the Princely States, and for the convening of a Constituent Assembly to frame the detailed constitution, and the formation of an interim government.

The League first accepted the Mission's proposals and later rejected them. An interim government with Jawaharlal Nehru and his colleagues was sworn in on 2nd September 1946. Later some Muslim members were also included in the Cabinet, but the League refused to join the Constituent Assembly, which met in December 1946, and began its work without any Muslim members in it.

In February 1947, therefore, the British Government declared its intention to quit India and appointed Lord Mountbatten to arrange the transfer of power by June 1948. The Muslim League resorted to "Direct Action" for securing Pakistan, which led to widespread communal riots. Partition was now inevitable.

Mountbatten who had assumed office as Viceroy on 24 March 1947, therefore announced a new procedure in June for partitioning the country into two dominions, and later advanced the date for transfer of power to 15 August 1947, on which date India was divided into two independent Dominions of the Westminster variety.

OUR TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS

LIEUT COLONEL YA MANDE

AN officer during his career attends, on the average, six to ten courses, at various training establishments. The schools and colleges provide him means and know-how to develop leadership. They keep him abreast of military thoughts and doctrines.

In this article an attempt is made to analyse training establishments in the light of some of our conditions. I must caution that such a study needs detailed analysis and expertise. My intention is primarily to generate thought on the subject.

THE EXISTING DESIGN

We will first draw a design of training establishments in our army. The DMT exercises overall control and issues directives. The organisational structure is federal where federated units i.e. training establishments enjoy considerable freedom. The establishments run various types of courses. For our study, we can divide the courses under three categories:—

- (a) *Departmental Courses*: Such courses are run by the departmental training establishments e.g. Infantry School, Armoured Corps Centre and School, ASC School and so on. These courses provide proficiency in one's own arm or service.
- (b) *General Courses*. Such programmes are run by establishments like College of Combat, Staff College, IAT, IDM and so on. The courses run are on subjects generally applicable to the army. The establishments teach concepts and doctrines.
- (c) *Courses of Skill*. These courses are run by training establishments for teaching a particular skill such as PT, D and M, WT and so on.

THE FUNCTION OF TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS

The training establishments strive to achieve a limited aim within the framework of the overall aim of training in the army. We will examine the function of training establishments in a different manner. Let us take the case of Capt B, who is attending a course of instruction—say JC.

Capt B is a keen and smart young blood. He is by no means raw in command and tactical problems at his level. He has read GS publications several times over. He has commanded a company and has taken part in war. In the latter respect perhaps he has an edge over his instructors.

Capt B is not happy in the beginning of the course. He finds nothing great in the instruction though he may not say so. Capt B suffers from a very normal phenomenon called ego and change resistance. Towards the middle of the course, he sees some significance in the instruction but finds it difficult to admit. Towards the end of the course, he does see meaningful content in the instruction but is more occupied with the activities connected with "Thank God it is over". The real change in Capt B is discernible only after he has rejoined the unit. He now practises and advocates, knowingly or unknowingly, what he was taught in the college.

Capt B is a case of an average officer under normal distribution. There will be few with different reactions on either side of the curve. Their case is immaterial because of small numbers.

And this is what training establishments do. They mould the thinking process of students and in due course all applicable officers are turned over in a similar manner. The ends achieved in establishments where skill as against concept is taught, are different. In their case students are made proficient in that particular skill.

We can now analyse some of the major flaws in the system. These are :—

- (a) The process is very slow. It is incapable of crashing. If we want to do crash teaching on some new ideas, weapons, or developments, the training establishments are not the answer. One has to look some where else—say formations and units. However, if we desire expertise, the specially formed training teams will provide the answer by visiting formations and units.
- (b) In the federated structure uniformity, even in concept, is difficult. One establishment does not know what the other is teaching. One never hears of anything such as conference of commandants of category A establishments. The control mechanism on attainment of objectives is loose. It is not my contention to advocate tight control, but the flaw is there and fairly glaring. The relationship between federated units i.e. training establishments is not well defined.
- (c) Was the training of Capt B effective? Such analysis is indeed difficult and depends on the consideration of aim of training and feedback. We will leave this question here for the time being.
- (d) Capt B is likely to be detailed on the next conceptual course after—say six years. Has the present course covered this gap? Has Capt B been prepared for the next six years? How much insight has he gained to cope up with future developments?

LEADERSHIP AS AIM OF TRAINING

We had asked a question earlier—was training of Capt B effective? This question, amongst other things, entails consideration of aim. The aim for the various courses are laid down in the directives. In any analysis, consideration of aim in itself is very important. The idea is not to dispute the aim, but consideration shows many areas which have been left out and places where emphasis has been wrongly placed.

We will consider aim in the large perspective. What is the aim of training? To my mind, the aim of training is to provide suitable kind of leadership at all levels. We do not run any specific leadership courses, but this is precisely what we are trying to achieve from the various training establishments. And therefore, one has to consider the aim of courses in relation to leadership requirements.

Some time back Mr Stefan Geisenheyner, editor-in-chief, Aerospace International, West Germany, had drawn my attention to the problems of leadership in a paternalistic society. The development of right kind of leadership is indeed difficult. In the game that we play, if other factors are even, the quality of leadership decides the issue. Wars are fought by leaders at all levels.

And therefore, what kind of leadership do we desire in the army? We know that leadership varies with levels. At section and platoon level, leadership is required of the kind "follow me". At company level, it is of the kind "I am with you". At battalion level, the leadership requirement takes a turn. It is of the kind "I am watching you, I will be with you when you need me". At brigade and higher level, the leadership requirement takes a complete turn. It becomes of the kind—"Well, here is a task for you. These are the difficulties as I foresee. Think it over and discuss with me. Let me know what assistance you need from my side".

Thus the leadership requirements vary. For our study we will take two extreme cases i.e. that of Nk Josh Ram and Brig Hoshiar Singh.

"Nk Josh Ram is alert, conscious of his rank and full of pride. He knows the complete background of every man in his section to an extent that he knows who is going to return late from leave. If he has his way, he would like to punish the defaulters but is so attached that he does not like matters going up. Where skills are concerned, he is the best man in his section e.g. weapon training, drill, physical training and so on. Nk Josh Ram is still sore about an incident which took place almost six months ago. Commanding officers had given a prize to a vehicle mechanic. Nk Josh Ram cannot reconcile himself to this. The vehicle mechanic may be a good craftsman but the fact remains that he had failed in range classification."

"Brig Hoshiar Singh is a man of few words. His strong points are versatile knowledge, clear concepts and understanding of human behaviour.

If you pose a problem, he straightway brings out a number of points for and against which you had never thought of. He is calm and cool; some times subordinates wonder how he can punish without raising even an eye brow. At times, the Brig is queer. The other day a young officer was marched before him for drunkenness and jazzy behaviour. The Brig left him free and what more—called him to his house for a drink. And for what earthly reason? The Brig quietly said “things may change”. Others thought—like hell!”

So much for leadership levels. The problem is how to bring about this change from ‘2 Lt level’ as the officers go up? How much can training contribute for the development of variation in leadership styles? Needless to say, if officer as they go up the ladder, carry with them “follow me” style, they will bring disaster.

In our army we can well be proud of leadership style that we have developed since independence. In this respect our superiority stands out when compared to our adversaries. The change has largely come about because of the democratic environments and the national heritage of philosophy and culture.

Leaders can be classified under three categories i.e. autocratic, laissez faire and democratic. We can safely discard laissez faire leaders. The ideal mix in our army under the present conditions is to have junior leaders as autocratic and senior leaders as democratic within the frame work of paternalistic society.

The problem is how to develop such a mix? As already stated, we have done well but we need a conscious and deliberate effort to develop suitable leadership. And here our courses of instruction can help.

A course of skill is essential for “follow me” type of leadership. It is applicable to a larger base. A course of concept, on the other hand, broadens the horizon and is suitable for the development of higher levels of leadership.

FEEDBACK AND PARAMETERS

Are our courses effective? It is difficult question and we haven't yet answered. The effectiveness has to be studied, in the light of results and feedback. We will, of course, not be over-influenced or misguided by spectacular achievements of the last war. Let us therefore have a look at the feedback from the units. I will record some of the statements heard by me at different periods of my service.

“I have only one company commander who is JC qualified. What am I to do with the other three?”

“My MTO, D and M qualified, has been posted out. I am finding a problem of replacement. Brigade HQ tells me that no vacancy is available till the next training year”.

creased to 16-20 weeks. It should be comprehensive to include tactics, administration, leadership and future developments. Teaching of tactics without concurrent study of administrative feasibility is futile and absurd. Equally, one cannot teach administration without knowledge of tactics. Afterall, administration for what and for whom? JC, thus is a basic course for all officers after commission. Unless the grounding is good, all subsequent courses are not likely to be very effective. All other courses can be cut in size provided JC is made more effective. The increase in effort for JC can be more than compensated.

SC COURSE

It is a good course for concepts. I would personally prefer that this course is made compulsory for all officers. However, this may not be possible in view of other constraints. This is all the more reason why JC must be made compulsory. The level of JC therefore should be company with good idea of functioning at a battalion/regiment level.

HC COURSE

Attendance at this course should be increased. The aim should be to include all officers who are likely to be promoted to higher ranks. The duration of this course should be reduced.

LEADERSHIP TRAINING

Leadership training should be introduced progressively from basic course onwards. Some of the important subjects are—communications, induction, motivation, human behaviour, discipline, leadership concepts, organisational culture and case studies.

MANAGEMENT TRAINING

Management training should be introduced at appropriate levels and places. Subjects which should be covered are functions of management and analytical tools. Officers should be introduced to some of the common disciplines applicable to the army such as work study, net work analysis, buying value analysis, operational research, systems analysis and so on.

AMALGAMATION OF ESTABLISHMENTS

Feasibility of amalgamation of training establishments should be considered. For example Institute of Work Study, EDP Training and so on can be merged with IDM. Similarly AATS and JAW can be merged.

SEMINARS

Seminars and study fortnights should be encouraged for Lt. Cols. and above.

BULLETINS

Publication of central weekly bulletins should be introduced. The subjects can be wide ranging such as leadership, analytical tools, economics political developments, new weapons and equipment and so on.

At the end of recommendations, I must introduce once again a word of caution. These are only one set of alternatives. Before any change is introduced a very detailed analysis is essential.

CONCLUSION

Our training establishments occupy a place of prestige because of their important role. It is time that we analyse our training establishments. With the growth of our army, our training establishments have also grown in quantity and output. We should now think in terms of quality, criterion and character.

While analysing training establishments, we should avoid "bits and pieces" approach. We should consider training as a complete system with the aim of providing suitable leadership at all levels.

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
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aspects are illustrated in the following graph :—



We had already assumed that the budget for training establishments has been fixed after due consideration. Within the fixed cost, we choose a number of alternatives for training courses—their duration, emphasis, number to be trained and so on. The problem is to lay a criterion so that suitable alternatives can be selected.

THE TRAINING OF UNIT COMMANDERS

The training for the bulk of officers in our army finishes at the level of majors when they have attended SO or equivalent course. Hereafter, they have to find their own way unless they belong to the category of the select few. This means that the important half of the career span is left uncovered.

We had already noticed that leadership style takes a turn at the level of battalion commanders. I cannot provide statistics, but there are a large number of Lt Cols IM GOOD who cannot get the best out of their command due to one-sided personality. Clearly at this stage there is a requirement for the knowledge of human relations, human behaviour, leadership concepts and wider horizon.

Training courses for Lt Cols and above is difficult as prolonged absence is not desirable. One should therefore explore the possibility of seminars and study fortnights. A measure which can be implemented without any difficulty is issue of weekly bulletin on the lines of "Bat Cheet", which will help to broaden the horizon. With suitable filing system, these will, in due course become the proud possession of the unit library. Our professional journals suffer because of subjective treatment and inability to deal with any subject in a comprehensive and progressive manner, while the pamphlets and precis lack liveliness to create interest.

RECOMMENDATIONS

COURSES OF SKILL

We must define courses of skill. To my mind these are courses connected with skills such as WT, PT, D and M and so on. These courses are essential for the development of "Follow me" leadership, and as such should be attended by the maximum numbers. Such courses should be run by each command or corps and the duration should not exceed four to six weeks. The aim of such courses should be to provide proficiency. Theory should be cut out. The courses should be run on the basis of "Country Fair" system, where instructors remain at fixed stand while batches rotate. Thus large numbers can be trained at low cost.

DEPARTMENTAL COURSES

Each arm or service runs departmental courses for its NCO's JCO's YOs, Company Commanders and Senior Officers. I will confine myself to the case of officers. The scheme is logical and good. The courses should be strictly confined to teaching on Corps subjects and as such duration for CC or SO should not exceed more than six to eight weeks. There should be no duplication of teaching already covered in JC or SC courses. The scheme of departmental school running courses for other arms and services should continue.

COURSES OF CONCEPTS

Courses other than those for skill, can be classified as courses, for concepts and general application. Amongst these courses, some are of primary concern such as JC, SC, DSSC and Technical Staff College. Other courses should be cut in size depending on their utility. A case for example is LDM. Nine months is too long a duration. JC, SC and HC Courses require further examination.

JC COURSE

This course must be made compulsory for all officers. At some stage, all officers must understand how battles are fought by the team of all arms and services and the Air Force. The duration of this course should be in-

"Major P has done JC and staff college. The trouble is—he does not now how to get along with subordinates or superiors. The training has made no difference".

"My four NCOs are qualified in WT. They are good, I wish all my NCOs were trained. Well, the training could be for lesser duration. After all, what do you look for in a unit—average performance or for show pieces" ?

"The scheme of unit instructors training others is becoming topsy turvey. I hope people know about interruptions in normal life during the last few years".

"The courses are becoming a headache. Does someone realise that I need officers to run my unit?"

"The JC was a bit of a farce, you know. The duration has been cut to 9 weeks. I learnt D and M in 12 weeks. After all what can the college teach in 9 weeks. There is something wrong with our emphasis. Anyway, it enables me to appear for staff college."

The comments on effectiveness of our training establishments are numerous. They emanate from students, units and even instructional staff. I have cited only a few to highlight possible alternatives relating to duration, emphasis, numbers and aim i.e. development of leadership.

The designing of courses needs consideration of several parametric issues such as :—

- (a) Number of officers to be trained.
- (b) Acceptable absence from units.
- (c) Frequency of emergencies which disrupt courses programme.
- (d) Aim, emphasis and efforts necessary to achieve the aim.
- (e) Cost.

The factors conflict with each other. For example if we want more numbers to be trained, we will have to accept greater absence and increase in cost. If we want greater effectiveness, the duration of courses must increase and so must the cost and absence ratio. The long courses have disadvantage of disruption due to frequent emergencies.

The factors not only conflict but provide alternatives. There are alternatives and alternatives. To keep the discussion short, I will list a set of alternatives in the recommendation. Each alternative has to be viewed in relation to its cost.


COST ANALYSIS

The consideration of cost analysis is important, particularly in our context. When faced with crisis, one comes across arbitrary situations such

as 10 % cut in training grant, restrictions in the use of MT, search for amalgamation of schools and so on.

Cost analysis is a long and difficult process. We will assume that within the defence budget weightage on training has been considered and accordingly percentage on training has been fixed. Further, the training budget has also been fixed under the head-training establishments.

There is an inter-relation between cost and other factors. Let us take the case of cost v/s effectiveness, which is illustrated below:—



From the above graph, it will be seen that certain minimum expenditure has to be incurred even for nominal effectiveness, thereafter cost and effectiveness are proportional till point A, after which additional expenditure does not increase corresponding effectiveness. Thus, in practice any expenditure beyond point A is not worth the money.

Within the fixed cost, we can vary the number of officers to be trained. But the effectiveness of training is also related to numbers. Cost is generally proportional to duration of training and duration to effectiveness. These

ARMED FORCES AND IDEALS

SQUADRON LEADER K.N. PARIK

FROM times immemorial, the kings, elderly statesmen, and army commanders have laid down ideals and causes for which nations have waged wars. Since wars begin in the minds of men, channelisation of minds towards laid down ideals is as important as possession of equipment and sophisticated weapons for waging wars. Without ideals, a nation may be compared to a ship without sheet anchor, a rudderless boat on high seas, without any chartered course.

Importance of well defined ideals and goals and laying down code of conduct for servicemen was realised soon after the Korean war, when it was proved beyond doubt that the communists could subvert the loyalties of the American prisoners of war, captured by them, through subtle and insidious propaganda methods. Enemy should be fought not only with guns and bullets but also with well-forged ideological weapons. It is also to be noted that the fighting man today is different from his counterpart in the past. He has an intelligent and enquiring mind, and as a citizen and soldier he desires to understand the ideals he is called upon to defend and also what stakes are involved if the hostile nation is able to impose its will on his country.

In order to understand importance of ideals, their impact and methods of inculcating them in servicemen, it is necessary to appreciate the working of group-mind, its varying reactions according to situations and circumstances.

GROUP AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS

Paradoxical though it may seem, the sum total of individuals in a group is greater than the group itself under a good leader whereas the standard of a group falls to the level of the lowest individual in the group, especially when it is badly led or it is under ineffective leadership. This is a peculiar fact of group—psychology. Says McDougall, "It is a notorious fact that when a number of men think and feel together, the mental operations and actions of each member of the group are apt to be very different from those he would achieve if he faced the situation as an isolated individual." Impact of group on individuals, sometimes raises the standard of individual and lowers it considerably at other times. The group standard declines in the following ways :—

- (a) Very often there is a fall in the level of intelligence, as the group mind tends to be guided by the level of least intelligent mind or level of least intelligent man in it. This is often seen in the illogical, absurd decisions taken by the group acting concertedly.

- (b) There is a fall in standards of behaviour and morality of the group. Few individuals in the group may cause bad habits like theft, dishonesty, smoking, drinking, sexual-intemperance to spread, among the other members. Here the well-known saying 'one fish, spoils the tank', holds good.
- (c) In war, fighting spirit and bravery of the group very often receives a set-back or suffers decline, when panic caused by an individual spreads like wild fire or contagious disease to all others in the group. This results in lowering the morale of the group as a whole.

METHODS OF COUNTER-ACTING UNDESIRABLE GROUP INFLUENCES

Evil influences manifested in the group as mentioned above, can be counter-acted in the following ways :—

- (a) Leader is selected for the qualities of head and heart and has a higher level of intelligence. He may seek advice of some intelligent members, in order to arrive at certain decisions. This avoids a fall in the standard of group intelligence, or in other words saves group, from taking unintelligent or impulsive decisions.
- (b) Ideals of patriotism, high standard of behaviour as enshrined in the code of conduct, self-sacrifice etc raise the morale of the group, which, does not succumb to lower standards of morality or cowardice when it is confronted with sudden threats or dangers from the enemy. Oliver Cromwell gave a divine purpose to his troops and made them realise that the most powerful common purpose that an army could have was to regard itself as a divine instrument, specially appointed and called forth to execute divine judgement. Inspired by such ideals, his soldiers won a series of engagements in a number of places, even against well trained and properly equipped royal troops, e.g. Marston Moor, Gloucester, New-bury, Alsford. They had better fighting spirit and moral fervour, which carried them through in all battles.

This clearly proves the fact that when troops are competently led, inspired by high purposes, the standard of achievement, valour, intelligence etc., reaches to new heights, never attained before.

NATIONAL AND MILITARY IDEALS

Modern wars are total wars, which involve participation of all sections of nation—civil as well as military. Morale of the nation and the army are closely inter-linked and cannot be treated as two different things. Both fall and rise together. National ideals should be provided by those at the helm of national affairs. The soldier, as a citizen shares national ideals alongwith other citizens. Says Copeland, "An army's most powerful weapons are its ideals. But these weapons, like all others must be forged by the nation".

Military ideals are set forth within the framework of national ideals and such are quite consistent with them.

Military ideals however cannot be confined to vague and abstract virtues like 'patriotism' and 'courage'. It was Dr. Johnson who pointed out that patriotism was the 'last refuge of the scoundrel'. He however did not intend to decry patriotism as such but wanted to ridicule those whose practice did not match with their proclamation. General S.L.A. Marshall in order to provide firm foundation to patriotism, would like to add few more fundamentals as guidance for the fighting men. According to him the soldier must have honour, and should be ready to sacrifice for general interest and should have veracity, justice, graciousness and integrity. These fundamental virtues will have ennobling effect and raise the individuals above selfish motives, petty bickering etc. The leaders of the army should not however be star-gazing visionaries or arm-chair philosophers. They must be guided by practical idealism.

In U.S.A., the code of conduct for the armed forces was prepared in 1956 and was subsequently adopted by the three services. This does not mean that no code of conduct existed in the past. The conventional code was however set forth in clear and compact statements. The Chinese communists were able to subvert the loyalties of the American prisoners of war captured in the Korean war (1950-53). The communists broke the American prisoners of war ideologically by using third degree methods, harsh treatment and constant indoctrination. The American P.Ws could not stand up to their cherished national and military ideals. General S.L.A. Marshall sums up the essence of six articles of code of conduct in the following words—"In spirit, it hardly goes beyond what citizen swears in pledging allegiance to the flag. The essence of the six articles is that the American fighter will hold his honour high and inviolate, how-so-ever he be assailed. He will not quit the fight he will never say or do what might hurt the United States or demean its uniform in the worst circumstances, he will join with other loyal Americans to help them and himself and to strengthen resistance by the whole. In short, come hell or high water, he will behave like a man."

RATIONALE FOR IDEALS

Why should a country have ideals for the nation as a whole and also for the armed forces? The reasons are not far to seek. The democratic countries have strong faith in individual freedom of action, voluntary co-operation of masses. In order to defend the values and causes for which the country fights for, it is imperative to have ideals, as they create call to action, bring a measure of unity and coherence in thoughts and conduct of millions of people composing the nation. Military ideals support the national aims. Says General S.L.A. Marshall "Military ideals are therefore related to this purpose, mainly as instruments of national survival".

During wars, there is almost a crisis of character, high ideals and standards of behaviour especially dealing with the enemies are thrown to winds.

It is true that all is fair in war and ethics and war cannot be mixed, yet keeping up of certain traditions is necessary. In U.S.A., Massacre at My Lai was taken seriously as it showed 'brutalisation of character'. There were loud protests against the brutality from the nation and as a result an enquiry was promptly made. The military traditions and ideals were not allowed to go by default.

It is military ideas which give fortitude to face the difficult circumstances, hard life to which an ordinary civilian is not accustomed. The military life makes strong demands in peace and war. The soldiers have to endure long separation from their families, face monotony and boredom in performing observation and guard duties, work in climates ranging from arctic to tropical. The source of inner strength is provided through military ideals. Says General S.L.A. Marshall "It is out of the important of ideals that men develop the strength to face situations from which it would be normal to run away."

Ideals provide purpose, sense of direction and inner strength, not only to individuals but to the entire group. The ideal strengthen the group, bring out co-operation of all individuals in it, and thus make the group greater than the sum-total of individuals in it. Men without ideals are creatures of impulses. With ideals and causes to guide them before men go ahead to attain them with all fire and determination.

VALUE AND METHODS AND INCULCATING IDEALS

It was Oliver Cromwell who first realised the value of inculcating ideals in his troops. His troops were taught from the 'Souldier's Catechisme' which were published in 1644. His magic formula, which won his troops many victories against Parliament's soldiers was 'Divine force, to the physical is as infinity to one'. The value of code of conduct formulated in U.A.R. in 1956 was put to crucial test in Vietnam. Majority of American prisoners of war, held by Communists could withstand the onslaught of the communist propaganda and indoctrination, as they had the prestige of the country and armed forces firmly embedded in their hearts.

It is imperative that programme of inculcating military ideals should also concentrate on teaching of national ideals also. Both types fit in a common pattern and are linked closely. A fighting man has to play a double role—as a citizen and as a soldier. He should be able to form a broad outlook of his obligations and responsibilities as a citizen of the country.

Inculcation of military ideals should not be left to orientation specialists or psychologists. A good leader by his personal example carries more weight and conviction with his men. In order to feel the pulse and identify himself with his troops, the leaders should participate in all forms of activities of the unit—games, sports, entertainment etc. He should often talk to the troops on national as well as military ideals.

It is not necessary to run a course of instruction on ideals. Men should be encouraged to study and imbibe them. Impression should be created by direct as well as indirect means. National as well as military ideal should be displayed on boards and charts in information rooms and libraries. We should not forget that they are powerful weapons of great importance in waging war against our enemies.

Over Hundred Years Ago

(USI JOURNAL — 1871—Page No. 97)

ON THE SALE OF SPIRITS IN REGIMENTAL CANTEENS

AT HOME, spirits are not sold in regimental canteens. In India they are. At home the soldier in order to get spirits must dress himself, and walk at least half a mile, on the average, to get the dram. In India it is brought to him; he can get it without the trouble of going out of barracks, and without the trouble of dressing himself. To sum up all in a few words, in India he can learn to drink spirits, and may in due time become a confirmed dram-drinker, without trouble to himself. At home this undue facility is not thrust on him.

2. Now, what effect has this difference in facility on the soldier? At home the soldier may occasionally go and have a carouse, and perhaps may come back drunk; but I do not think that under the home system, soldiers, certainly not the recruits, will learn to be habitual spirit-drinkers; whilst under the India system they are led to it, they are taught it by the undue facility given them. I will quote my own experience on this point. When the regiment, to which I belong, came to India a year and a half ago, the average number of drams of spirits sold in the canteen daily was under 23. It has now increased to 200 per day, and in another year or two the number will, I fear, under this vicious system have increased to 400.

3. When the soldier has once acquired a craving for spirits, I do not suppose that he will stop, after a time at least, at one dram. After a time he will get what he can in the canteen, and go elsewhere for the remainder. But why teach the soldier to drink spirits? It is pretty certain, that if at the commencement of our service in India, there were not more than 20 men, who cared enough about spirits to go to the canteen for them, there must have been still fewer, who would have taken the trouble to dress and walk into the bazaar to get them.

FEAR AND THE SOLDIER

CAPTAIN MOHAN SAHA*

INTRODUCTION

SOLDIERING has almost always been synonymous with deeds of valour and heroism and for an ordinary mortal fear is the last thing a soldier can be associated with. But history of war has ample examples where, fully equipped armies have lost battles because panic was created amongst them due to baseless fear. Incidents are also known where a very small band of soldiers have created havoc amongst a large group of enemy because of the tactics which created an element of surprise and an impression of superior force—the enemy capitulating out of sheer fear. Fear amongst combatants played a very vital role during various stages of World War II, when the allied troops, after having suffered many initial reverses, had taken the supremacy of the German fighting forces for granted. Students of military history are only too familiar with the 'Order of the Day' issued by the allied commander in the Desert theatre of war where the allied troops were told that the Germans, and particularly Rommel, were no super humans. All this was done to dispel fear amongst the soldiers which was having a detrimental effect on their fighting capabilities.

PHYSIOLOGY OF FEAR

Fear can be defined as a psycho-physiological reaction occurring when an individual finds or believes himself in danger and with reference to a soldier it occurs primarily during defence or retreat. Infact, it can occur in any adverse situation where the individual is unable to respond and adjust himself in a manner required to control that situation. But it must be borne in mind that occurrence of fear is not a natural sequence of an adverse or a fearful situation only. It depends upon the exposure and reaction of an individual to a similar situation in the past; his physical and mental alertness, his maturity, his mental capabilities to judge a situation as potentially dangerous and incidences in his childhood that have instilled an inherent sense of fear in him for a particular situation—in case of which his only reponse will be to hide or flee from that situation instead of comprehending it and acting sensibly.

The manifestations of fear are induced by the action of the Sympathetic Nervous system. It includes a variety of conditions ranging from mild foreboding and apprehension to paralysing terror. Its chief symptoms are

*RMO, 9th Battalion the Garhwal Rifles

tachycardia (increased heart beats), trembling, a sinking feeling and in extreme cases loss of control of bowels and bladder. Many persons have auditory and visual hallucinations (hearing and seeing imaginary things) which they would otherwise correctly identify as coming from their own fantasies.

FEAR DURING WAR

Fear, of various types, has been confronting mankind since its inception. Initially, there were various unexplained natural phenomena which instilled a sense of fear in him but with the progress of science the secrets of nature were unfolded. Reason and logic made mankind capable of comprehending things which he otherwise thought supernatural and mysterious. But that is not the end of it. With the passage of time and progress of civilisation various other things have been causing fear in Man's life. They are the fear of disease, pain, social insecurities and death. Over and above all these, a soldier in battle has the additional fears of injuries, getting captured and subsequent tortures by the enemy and defeat. But his greatest fear amongst others is that will he be able to survive? For any one who has not been in battle, it is hard to believe that of all the emotions of a soldier during battle, the most dominant is the fear of self destruction. The unending scenes of mutilation and death of comrades, that a soldier sees during war, weak him emotionally and makes him unstable. Tolstoy writes in 'War And Peace'—"When a man sees an animal dying, a horror comes over him. What he is himself—his essence, visibly before his eyes, perishes—ceases to exist. But when the dying creature is a man dearly loved; then, besides the horror at the extinction of life, what is felt is rendering of the soul, a spiritual wound, which, like a physical wound, is sometimes mortal, sometimes healed, but always aches and shrinks from contact with the outer world, that sets it smarting."

Behind the facade of intense patriotism, devotion to duty, the singleness of purpose and the missionary zeal with which a soldier fights, a critical analysis will show that fatigue and fear from the main state of his physical and emotional being. General George S. Patton Jr says in 'War As I Knew It'—"No sane man is unafraid in battle". A soldier in battle vacillates between his sole purpose of killing or capturing the enemy and the fear of the same fate being meted out to him. The all powerful sense of self preservation tempts him to escape the situation but his fears of being considered a coward holds him back. S.L.A. Marshall has said—"Troops do not conquer their fear of death and wound." The fear of injuries to the self is aroused by the uncertain nature of the enemy. Uncertain, because the enemy cannot be expected where the soldier wants him nor act in the manner the soldier expects him to. This creates the fear of the unknown. This fact is borne out by the general observation that troops are more apprehensive and nervous just prior to going into battle than at the height of battle or during close combat—because at this moment he exactly knows what he has to deal with.

EFFECTS OF FEAR ON THE SOLDIER

Having discussed the factors which produce fears in combatants we now try to see its effects on the fighting capabilities of the soldier.

Paralysing terror, which is produced by extreme fear, can render a soldier completely inactive and this prevents him not only from fighting but from taking basic precautions for his personal safety. In such conditions he might refuse to advance against the enemy and instead of being an efficient member of the fighting team he will be a liability and a detriment to the morale of the unit as a whole. The sense of discipline, pride and upholding the traditions of the unit which have been drilled into the soldier since the time of his recruitment is all forgotten during this moment of intense fear. Milder forms of fear will produce a tendency to complacency and slackness which in turn will result in incomplete execution of the task assigned to the individual.

HOW TO PREVENT FEAR

Fear on the battle field has been a universal phenomenon since time immemorial. One of the greatest philosophies—Gita—could have never been given to the world had not Arjuna experienced a sense of fear at the start of Mahabharata. What Lord Krishna told Arjuna at that time is today known as indoctrination. And that is what is required for every soldier going into battle. A well indoctrinated soldier, who knows what he is fighting for and what he stands to lose in the event of defeat, will be less prone to fear and he can easily overcome it. He should be forewarned about the normal occurrence of fear which every one experiences initially while going into battle and he should be prepared to emotionally adjust himself and face it. For, the bravery of an individual does not lie in his not being afraid but in the fact that he can overcome his fears and perform normally in spite of it. The following incident—from Tolstoy's 'War And Peace'—precisely describes the emotions of a soldier going into battle. "In former days Rostov had fear while going into an engagement; now he had not the slightest feeling of fear. He had not lost his fears from growing used to being under fire (one can never get accustomed to danger) but from gaining control of his feelings in face of danger. He had schooled himself when going into action to think of any thing except what one would have supposed to be more interesting than any thing else—the danger in store for him. Earnestly as he strove to do this, and bitterly as he reproached himself for cowardice, he could not at first succeed in this. But with years it had come of itself. He felt sorry to see the excited face of Illyin (who was going into battle for the first time)*, who talked a great deal nervously. He knew by experience the agonising state of anticipation of terror and death, —, and he knew that nothing but time could help him out of it."

Though, indoctrination and recognition of fear as a normal phenomenon do help but that is not the end of it. His overall discipline, esprit

*Inserted by the Author.

de-Corps, confidence in his leaders and his knowledge of situation of battle, go a long way in allaying his fears of battle. They help him in fighting his fears and protecting himself. Care should be taken to prevent a sense of idleness amongst troops because more they brood, the more apprehensive, they become. They should be encouraged, within the given circumstances to communicate their feelings with their comrades as this will help them in objectively analysing their own fears and tension and dispelling them.

SUMMARY

Many factors go in to create a sense of fear amongst soldiers in combat and these include causes from unpreparedness to loss of wits' at the time of fighting. In this article an attempt has been made to discuss the physiology of fear and the factors, operating during combat, which create a sense of fear amongst soldiers and ways and means to prevent it.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to Lt Col SC Gupta, Commanding Officer; and many others, who discussed with me their experiences of war.

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NUCLEAR INDIA

A REVIEW ARTICLE

P. K. MISHRA

THE nuclear explosion carried out by India at Pokhran on 18th May 1974 marks a new era in the history of Indian Science and technology. The very fact that the entire planning and operation of the whole experiment was conducted by our own scientists without much dependence on any other country is a pointer towards our march on the path of self-reliance. After this peaceful operation, India has not only found a place for itself in the nuclear club, but also her leadership in South and Southeast Asia has been firmly established. It has generated in us a tremendous amount of self confidence to march forward. Another significant thing to note here is that it was one of the most successful underground explosion without much of radio-active impact on the surrounding region.

It is but natural that after this nuclear experiment, a national debate has taken place on a large scale in this country and scholars have reviewed the progress made by India in its program of atom for peace. Some have looked at it purely from a technical angle. Some have seen the pros and cons of the economic impact of such experiments. Yet some others have analysed it mainly from security points. Besides, most of them have emphasized its impact on the internal and external policy making process in India. J.P. Jain*, with the background of a political scientist makes a searching analysis of our nuclear history. In this first volume he analyses our atomic energy programme since the dawn of independence until the Pokhran experiment. His second volume is a repository of all important documents on the atomic history.

In this introduction he focuses the attention of the readers on our nuclear capability and elucidates various ways how atomic energy can be successfully utilized for our economic development. He rightly feels that utilization of nuclear science and technology cannot always be the monopoly of the industrially advanced nations because that will further increase "the gap between developed and developing countries". On July 1970 the late Vikram V.A. Sarabhai rightly said that India's problems of poverty and regional imbalances cannot be effectively tackled without the development of nuclear power. The future as envisaged by the report of the Atomic Energy Department during 1957-58 was that 'India would be able to produce all the basic materials required for the production of atomic energy, promote its

*Nuclear India, 2 Vols by J. P. Jain, New Delhi Radiant Publishers, 1974, Vol. I, pp. 200, Price Rs. 40/- Vol. II, pp. 440, Price Rs. 75/-

use in agriculture, biology, industry and medicine, prepare a long range plan for the generation of electric power and set up atomic power stations". (Vol. I. p. 7). The rough estimate was that by 2000 A.D. atomic power stations alone will meet 30 % of our power needed. It is in the fitness of things to remember here the statement of the late H.L. Bhabha in his Presidential Address at the First International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy during August 1955 when he said, "For the full industrialization of the under-developed areas, for the continuation of our civilization and it's further development, atomic energy is not merely an aid, it is an absolute necessity. The acquisition by man of knowledge of how to release and use atomic energy must be recognised as the third great epoch in human history". (Vol. II, p. 14). With such a vision he and his successors have shaped our atomic energy programmes in this country.

In three subsequent chapters, Jain analyses the organization and working of the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) with a special emphasis on its promotional activities. The major purpose for the creation of I.A.E.A. was to render technical and economic help to the non-nuclear powers in harnessing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Bhabha made it very clear at the IAEA Statute Conference on 15th October, 1956 (Vol II, p. 53) that the agency's primary function was "not to be a police body, but to be a positive creative force for good". If in the interest of mutual security, it was considered necessary to deposit all the stock-piles of fissionable material, he observed, then it must be done on a universal basis by mutual agreement and not imposed only on a particular group of states, viz., those receiving aid from the agency. Indian position of the safeguards system of the IAEA was that fissionable material produced in agency-aided projects in a country should remain at the disposal of that country, which should have the right to decide whether it wished to go ahead with a particular use of that fissionable material or not. (p. 37). With the initiative of the I.A.E.A., offers of assistance in form of materials, equipment, fellowships, training facilities, etc., were made by certain countries.

India was prepared initially to support the limited safeguards system provided it didn't retard the development of atomic energy programmes of the less-developed states and did not increase the gap between the developed and the developing countries. As atomic weapons can be made from two types of special fissionable materials, viz., enriched uranium and plutonium, India, in the author's views, was quite willing to concede that the supply of such materials should attract safeguards, notwithstanding the discrimination that it would have involved against countries which could not produce them and the futility of such safeguards in the context of the freedom of the countries able to produce such materials to continue to do so for military purpose. (Vol. I. p. 43). During the 15th session of IAEA. Indian representative Rajan rightly pointed out that the maximum objective of the safeguard system was segregation, rather than prevention (Vol. II, p. 50).

Dr. R. Sagane, Executive Vice-President, Japan Atomic Power Co. Ltd. Tokyo identifies four major areas about the promotional activities of the IAEA. These are : 1. Access to information, 2. Providing means and tools, 3. Providing opportunities for training and education, 4. Building research reactions or nuclear power plants or providing long-term financial assistance (Vol. I, p. 53). The main themes of the programme, endorsed by the 1968 IAEA General Conference were continuing technical assistance and training; promotion of research and development; fostering of world wide co-operation; speeding the flow of information; and safeguarding of nuclear materials. However, the author is critical of the fact that IAEA's policing function has overwhelmed its promotional role. An important lacuna of the present safeguard system as pointed out by him is that it concerns itself only with the possibilities of governmentally authorised diversion of strategic materials from a nuclear power industry to a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. (Vol. I. p. 102). He rightly feels that safeguards system can be effective only if promoted by "an international consensus", rather than being imposed on world in the interests of a powerful few.

Jain in his two subsequent chapters points out the significance of peaceful atomic explosions as conducted by India and emphasizes on the new prestige that the country has acquired. His views are substantiated by a large number of documents collected in his second volume. Peaceful nuclear explosions, as emphasized by him are "the cheapest and quickest ways" of carrying out projects involving the moving of large amounts of earth, such as construction of canals, dams, ports, artificial lakes, mountain tunnels and navigable passes through mountainous terrain. (Vol. I p. 106) H.N. Sethna, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission in his extensive interview over All India Radio on 18th May 1974, more or less elucidated on these points (see Vol. II, pp. 332-35).

The author makes certain interesting observations about the implications of India's explosion. He strongly feels that there is only a narrow passage between the military and peaceful use of nuclear power. The self-imposed abstinence from nuclear weapons, as followed by India may be observed or violated depending upon "the relevant political, economic, and strategic factors". He also delineates certain new advantages that India has gained after Pokhran explosion. According to him it raises India's status in the world and enhances her prestige. It also raises the fighting morale of the armed forces and instils a spirit of self-confidence among the people at large. It provides a powerful incentive to apply the team spirit, the attitude of dispensing with red-tapism and administrative deadblocks and the self-reliant approach, adopted in the field of nuclear technology to our economic, social and political problems (Vol. I, p. 137). He rightly points out that India was the first country to conduct an underground atomic test which requires much sophistication. In the technical field, such experiments can be successfully used in the field of mining and earth operations. The military

implication as pointed out by him, is that it demonstrates India's capabilities in the nuclear field and is a step in the direction of establishing India as "a centre of independent decision-making". (Vol. I, p. 140). Moreover India's nuclear capabilities as he feels, is likely to reduce New Delhi's dependence on Moscow. (Vol. I, p. 144). In his second volume his documentation on the hue and cry raised by Pakistan provides an interesting study by itself.

In his concluding observations, Jain is highly critical of the discriminatory attitude shown by the nuclear weapon states on the rest of the world. He attempts to justify India's objection in signing the N.P.T. He is quite right in his defence and strongly feels that India cannot afford to ignore her security needs. She cannot become a party to any discriminatory arrangement like the N.P.T. and take to herself a second rate status. On the whole it is a valuable documentary study on the nuclear history of India. It is not only useful for students of diplomacy and military science, but also provides an interesting reading to the layman. It will be more useful if the author takes care to include in any future edition, the reaction of the general public in India, especially the social, political and economic elites, after the Pokhran experiment was carried out.

(Continued from page 41)

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BOOK REVIEWS

INDO-SOVIET TREATY : REACTIONS AND REFLECTIONS

by N.M. Ghatate

(Published by Deendayal Research Institute, New Delhi, 1972) pp. 300,
Price Rs. 30/-.

THE Indo-Soviet Treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation signed on the 9th August, 1971 was an important landmark in the history of Indian diplomacy. The timing of such a new foreign policy move, certainly adds colours to the matured statesmanship of Shrimati Indira Gandhi. When one makes a bird's eyeview of the twelve articles in the treaty, the first reaction that comes to one's mind is that without sacrificing her non-aligned posture, India was in a position to negotiate and finally sign such a treaty on a footing of equality. Moreover it is also felt that strictly in terms of the security of India, it has heightened our morale. The timing of the treaty during Bangladesh struggle for nationhood also raised certain apprehensions in the minds of different nations. N.M. Ghatate as the editor of this book tries to seek answers to many such issues arising out of the treaty. It seems the editor in course of his discussion in the introductory chapter finds fault with practically every portion of the treaty. He is more than convinced that it is an unequal treaty and it only suits Soviet national interests rather than that of India. To him Soviet intervention in case of India's security being threatened by China or Pakistan is a wishful thinking (see Introduction, p. 6). But Soviet involvement during the Bangladesh crisis repudiates such a viewpoint. Again he strongly feels that by the treaty Soviet Union has scored a diplomatic coup by giving their undisputable voice in the South Asian affairs. But the editor could possibly see for himself the new course of events in the sub-continent since the treaty was signed. One doesn't see any Soviet interference either in our internal affairs or in our external moves.

The book provides the readers with many interesting observations by different political parties, and comments by leading political personalities and intellectuals. Especially one should not miss the views expressed by Piloo Modi, Romesh Thaper (p 75), M.S. Rajan (p. 72), K.P. Menon (p. 129), and K. Subramaniam (p. 147), and Subramaniam Swami (p. 159). The editorial comments expressed by Indian newspapers are also equally revealing. Some of them give unqualified support (e.g. Patriot, National Herald), whereas some others raise apprehensions (e.g. Statesman, Times of India). The reader can't afford to miss the comments expressed by foreign newspapers,

particularly the leading dailies from USA, U.K., Cario, and Pakistan. On the whole it is a useful compilation by the Deendayal Research Institute for the students of international affairs. Hopefully the Institute will compile many such useful documents on the diplomacy of India and her neighbours.

PKM

NEHRU'S EMISSARY TO KASHMIR (OCTOBER 1947)

by Hiralal Atal

(Published by Army Educational Stores, New Delhi, 1972) pp. 183, Price Rs. 20/-.

DURING the time of independence of India, a lot of confusion was created in public mind as regards the accession of Kashmir into the Indian Union. A number of books have been written by Indians and foreigners throwing lights on the fast course of events and the different role played by various personalities during this period. But most of them have analysed these events as outside observers. They have neither been the actors in the political drama, nor have they seen the operations from a closer angle. That is why their painstaking studies have been only based upon newspaper reports and personal interviews of some of the leaders who were actively involved in the drama. Hiralal Atal, as a Brigadier in Indian Army, was the Director of Personnel Services after partition. He was selected by Jawaharlal Nehru as his personal emissary to go to Kashmir and make an on the spot observation of the happenings in Kashmir. He was sent as a liaison officer to Kashmir Government without any operational control over the forces. His mission was very clearly indicated by the P.M. to him in his first meeting in the following words, "The situation in Kashmir was so vague and unknown that he (P.M.) wanted some one to go there to probe, investigate and report to him the true picture (p. 19)."

While performing his duty he made a careful study of not only the actual political and strategic position of Kashmir but also the role played by the main actors like Sheikh Abdullah and others. Although this study lacks historians insight, as the biographical account of a man who saw the real drama from a closer angle it is definitely worth recommending for students on Kashmir affairs. But the author should have improved his style of presenting various events with historical accuracy.

PKM

PREVENTING WORLD WAR III : SOME PROPOSALS

by Quincy Wright, William M. Evan and Morton Deutsch

(Simon and Schuster, New York, 1962), pp. 460, price \$ 6.95.

QUINCY Wright who heads the list of editors of this book was a leading scholar of international law and relations. For decades he influenced

the thinking minds not only in the United States but in many other parts of the world also with his writings which had a sense of mission. The book under review is an example of his concerns and anxieties.

Twenty-nine essays which form part of the subject matter of the book have been written on different topics but all of them represent an effort to increase our understanding of the agonizing problems of war and peace. Thus there is a thematic unity in the book. All authors—whether they belong to sciences or humanities—bring their diligence and intelligence to bear on ways of averting a nuclear catastrophe. Each author attempts to articulate proposals which would lessen the chances of war.

Divided into three parts, the book begins with the immediate and urgent problem of stopping the arms race. It attempts to deal comprehensively with problems involved in working out ways of dealing with the horrors of modern military weapons. Each essay in this part focuses on an important aspect of the total problem and volunteers solutions and suggestions. More important papers in this section are by Melman, Bohn, Karl Deutsch and Gerad.

The increase in international tensions is treated in the second part of the book. Contributors such as Osgood Fromm, Rapoport and Russell offer proposals aimed at the reduction of international tensions and the development of perspectives which could provide a basis for fruitful negotiations. The last part highlights the long range problem of building a world society. The book concludes with an epilogue in which each of the editors, take into account the views of the various authors and present a general essay from the point of view of his own field; psychology, sociology and international relations.

The basic assumptions of this valuable book are that war is not inevitable or beyond human control and the scientists can contribute to the making of peace as effectively as they have contributed to the making of war.

KPM

"AUSTRALIAN ARMY GUIDONS AND COLOURS

by Alfred N. Festberg

Published by Melbourne Allora Publisher, 1972) pp. 142.

THE origin of carrying colours goes back to the early days when man fixed his family album to a pole and held it up in the battle for the double purpose of indicating his position and acting as a rallying point whenever an occasion arose.

Guidons and Standards have the same history where the Knights during nights used to patrol areas with the intention of safeguarding the interests, property and life of the people of their sovereign. Those Knights who distinguished themselves in the service of the sovereign were permitted to carry a Standard; others used to carry Guidon (a dove-tail flag). With the intro-

duction of regimentation, regiments of cavalry, battalions of infantry were allowed to carry Standards/Guidons/Colours which are taken into use only after a special ceremony with the approval of the sovereign.

Regimental Colours/Standards/Guidons are the symbol of spirit of the regiments. These, prior to being taken into use, are consecrated at a religious ceremony and on them are emblazoned the sacred memory of heroic deeds and distinction of long and honourable service, the battle honours and the regimental badges. The Standards/Guidons/Regimental Colours, in fact, are a portable silken regimental history, regarded in veneration and a source of pride to the soldiers and ex-soldiers of a particular regiment/unit.

Sir Edwar Hamely has aptly described the Colours as follows:—

A moth-eaten rag on a worm-eaten pole,
It does not look likely to stir a man's soul,
'Tis the deeds that were done 'neath the moth-eaten rag,
When the pole was a staff, and the rag was a flag.

The Colours after service are laid up in a sacred place, thus maintaining that atmosphere of veneration with which they are surrounded.

Alfred N. Festberg in his book titled "Australian Army Guidons and Colours" has compiled the pictorial presentation, description, significance and origin of the Guidons and Colours of the Australian Army. The compilation does present their ready references with details of dates, places of presentation and places of laying off. The material of the book is based on a great deal of research of archival and departmental records, general and Military Orders, Army Orders, Military Boards and instructions. The information has been produced with great care and pain. The book is an important document for all those who are interested to know about the Colours/Standards/Guidons and flags and banners of the Australian Army.

The author has divided his work in 12 chapters. In the first 6 Chapters he detailed with the Regimental Colours, Kings Colours in depth and presents their detailed history. Regimental Colours are awarded only to the infantry of the lines. The other 6 Chapters deal with Guidons and flags which are awarded to the cavalry regiments and other institutions and establishments.

However, there appears to be a noticeable lapse with regard to the absence of Standards which are normally awarded to heavy regiments of the cavalry. There is a possibility that in the Australian Army there may not be any custom of awarding Standards to their cavalry. As such, mention of Standards has been omitted in this book.

I wish to congratulate the author for compiling such a useful book. This could not be done without sincere and hard work.

In my opinion this is an important and a very useful book for the students of Military History of the Australian Army.

TBK

THE MASTERS OF POWER

by Brian Crozier,

(Published by Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1969) pp. 416, Price £ 3.

AUTHOR of Franco's biographical history, Brian Crozier has already earned the reputation for his scholarly and judicious writings. The book under review essentially deals with the dynamics of power and also with some of the leading figures of contemporary international relations who acquired power and attempted to preserve it to the extent possible. It does not attempt biographies of these wielders of power but discusses them in the context of specifically significant events in which they were involved or which they handled.

The book is divided into three parts. The first entitled Internal Power deals with personalities. Beginning is made with General de Gaulle and how he successfully attempted to resolve the Algerian problem which had presented to France one of the greatest dilemmas of its history. How the resolution of this question enormously added to De Gaulle's stature and prestige is recounted in detail. Then he takes up Franco who had earlier been a subject of his book-length study. The author mentions that Franco used to keep at his bed-side a copy of Machiavelli's *Prince* annotated by Napoleon. How the Spain's legendary ruler came to power and how he consolidated his power is described authoritatively and brilliantly. Next he takes up Mao Tse Tung's hundred flowers' policy and the role of the K.G.B. in the Soviet Union. Very interestingly he also discusses how the three British Prime Ministers—Eden, MacMillan and Wilson—endeavoured to solve the three crises which arose when they were in office. How Eden and MacMillan used their power to deal with the Suez crisis and how Wilson dealt with devaluation. He compares the powers of these Prime Ministers with the two Presidents of the United States, Kennedy and Johnson, when they handled Cuban Missile Crisis and Dominican Republic situation respectively.

The second part of the book takes up various types of conflict situations such as nuclear power, limited war, revolutionary war, military intervention and secret war. The confrontations of Khrushchev, Eisenhower and Kennedy are discussed in this context. It is an extremely interesting part of the book.

In the last part entitled Towards a Philosophy of Power, the author criticises current international institutions which have not been able to solve the problems of the modern day world. He comes forward with suggestions which are well worth considering in the context of the actual uses of power.

On the whole, this is an excellent book and worthy of attention of all those who are interested in the problem of power which is of pivotal significance in contemporary society.

KPM

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 CHAWLA, Maj H.C.
 CHHATWAL, Maj G.S.
 CHHILLAR, Capt R.K.
 CHOPRA, Capt Vinod Chander
 CHOUDHARY, Maj Krishan
 DAHIYA, Capt B.R.S.
 DASS, Maj P.K.
 DAS GUPTA, Flt Lt B.P.
 DAVESAR, Capt R.K.
 DAVID, Flt Lt G.M.
 DEOGAN, Sqn Ldr K.K.
 DESOUZA, Flt Lt C.
 D'SOUZA, Flt Lt P.C.F.
 DEWAN, Capt P.K.
 DHALIWAL, Flt Lt R.S.
 DHILLON, Capt K.S.
 DHILLON, Capt P.P.S.
 DHILLON, Maj T.S.
 DHIMAN, Capt P.S.
 DHINGRA, Capt M.L.
 DHONDIYAL, Maj S.N.
 DUBE, Maj Ashish
 DOD, Maj K.B.N.S.
 DOGRA, Maj R.K.
 DUBY, Capt S.V.
 DUTT, Maj K.K.
 DUTTA, Maj S.N.
 DWIVEDI, Flt Lt K.P.
 GANDHI, Capt B.K.
 GANESAN, Maj P.
 GAUTAM, Maj A.P.
 GEORGE, Capt R.
 GHOLE, Capt V.M.
 GHOSH, Capt D.K.
 GHOSH, Flt Lt S.R.
 GHURIANI, Flt Lt S.K.
 GIDDA, Capt G.S.
 GILL, Capt H.S.
 GOGNA, Capt V.M.
 GOKHALE, Capt A.S.

- GOKHALE, Capt Chandra Shekhar
 (LIFE)
 GULERIA, Capt S.S.
 GUPTA, Capt I.J.
 GUPTA, Capt P.R.
 GUPTA, Capt R.D.
 GUPTA, Maj S.
 GUPTA, Capt S.C.
 GURU PRATAP CHANDRA, Maj
 HAJELA, Capt S.K.
 HANDA, Fg Offr A.K.
 HARMANDAR SINGH, Flt Lt
 IDNANI, Maj L.C.
 INAMDAR, Capt R.B.
 IQBAL SINGH, Maj
 JACOB XAVIER, Flt Lt
 JAGANI, Maj N.L.
 JAGGI, Capt T.S.
 JAINARAIN, Capt
 JAIS, Capt R.T.
 JAIPAL SINGH, Capt
 JAMWAL, Capt A.S.
 JAMWAL, Brig Goverdhan Singh
 JAMWAL, Maj K.S.
 JASBIR SINGH, Capt
 JASINDER SINGH, Maj
 JASROTIA, Capt R.S.S.
 JASWAL, Capt A.S.
 JASWAL, Maj Vasdev
 JAYARAJAN, Flt Lt S.K.
 JOG, Sqn Ldr R.V.
 JOHN, Flt Lt K.T.
 JOHRI, Maj A.
 JOLLY, Maj M.M.
 JOSHI, Capt I.B.P.
 JOSHI, Maj P.S.
 JULIUS, Flt Lt C.K.
 KANWAR, Capt M.S.
 KAPOOR, Capt K.B.
 KAPUR, Capt A.
 KAPUR, Capt Praveen
 KAPUR, Capt Ravinder Nath
 KAPUR, Capt Rana S.K.
 KAR, Capt Rahul S.M.
 KARNIK, Capt S.D.
 KASTURIA, Fg Offr Vijindra
 KAUSHAL, Maj B.L.
 KAUSHIK, Capt M.N.
 KELKAR, Maj A.L.
 KEWAL BALI, Maj
 KHANORIA, Capt K.C.
 KHANNA, Maj A.K.
 KHANNA, Maj B.K.
 KHERA, Maj B.N.
 KHATTTRI, Maj F.B.
 KHOLE, Flt Lt B.N.
 KISHORE, Capt K.
 KOHLI, Maj A.K.
 KRISHINA, Maj K.T.
 KUMAR, Capt B.L.
 KYTE, Flt Lt C.A.
 LALOTRA, Capt J.S.
 LAKHWINDER SINGH, Maj
 LEEKHA, Maj A.K.
 LEGHA, Maj R.S.
 LOHIA, Capt Ramesh Chandra (Life)
 MADAN GOPAL, Capt
 MAHAJAN, Maj S.K.
 MAHLAWAT, Maj C.P.S.
 MAKKAR, 2/Lt V.S.M.
 MALIK, Shri Arjan Dass
 MALIK, Capt Rajan Anand (Life)
 MALIK, Flt Lt V.M.
 MANOHAR SINGH, Maj
 MARATHE, Fg Offr K.G.
 MEHTA, Maj H.K.S.
 MINHAS, Flt Lt G.S.
 MOGHE, Capt S.G.
 MOHINDER SINGH, Capt
 MOHINDER PAL SINGH, Capt ..
 MOHLA, Capt S.N.
 MULTANI, Capt J.S.
 MURTHY, Sqn Ldr D.V.N.
 MURTHY, Flt Lt R.S.
 NAIDU, Maj M.L.
 NAIDU, Capt N.R.
 NAIR, Capt D.V.R.
 NAIR, Flt Lt G.K.
 NANDA, Capt A.S.
 NANDRAJOG, Maj S.P.

NANJAPPA, Capt M.C.
 NARULA, Maj S.C.
 NAUTIYAL, Maj R.P.
 NAYAR, Capt G.M.
 NAYYAR, Capt T.L.
 NIMBALKAR, Maj V.M.
 OLA, Maj D.C.
 ONKAR SINGH, Capt
 OPINDER KUMAR, Maj
 PADHYAY, Capt N.B.
 PANDE, Maj A.P.
 PANDIT, Fg Offr V.B.
 PANGHAL, Capt S.S.
 PANT, Maj D.C.
 PANWAR, Maj R.S.
 PARAB, Capt D.H.
 PARADKAR, Sqn Ldr
 PARIDA, Capt A.K.
 PATANKAR, Capt V.G.
 PATHANIA, Capt S.S.
 PATIL, Capt Vijay
 PERHAR, Maj N.S.
 PETERS, Flt Lt R.I.
 POULOSE, Maj P.Y.
 PRABHUDESAI, Capt A.K.
 PREM NATH, Capt
 PURI, Flt Lt N.K.
 RADHA KRISHNAN, Flt Lt R.
 RAGAVULU, 2/Lt N.M.V.
 RAGHAVACHARI, Flt Lt K.S.
 RAGHU, Flt Lt G.V.
 RAJ, Fg. Offr A.S.
 RAJ, Capt G.D.
 RAJAGOPAL, Maj M.
 RAJENDRA KUMAR, Capt
 RAJENDRA SINGH, Flt Lt
 RAMESH SEHGAL, Capt
 RAM KARAN, Capt
 RANA, Capt S.O.
 RANA, Maj S.S.
 RANAWAT, Flt Lt Vikram Singh
 RANDHIR SINGH, Capt
 RANGI, Capt N.S.
 RAO, Flt Lt S.G.N.
 RASAM, Capt V.B.

RAVINDRAN, Capt P.
 RAVINDER SINGH, Capt
 RAWAT, Maj G.S.
 RAWAT, Capt R.S.
 REDDY, Capt V.R.
 REDDY, Fg Offr V.J.P.
 SABHERWAL, Maj B.M.S.
 SACHDEVA, Fg Offr R.P.S.
 SAHI, Capt H.S.
 SAINI, Flt Lt M.K.
 SAJAN SINGH, Capt (Life)
 SAMBYAL, Capt A.S.
 SANDHU, Maj H.J.S.
 SANDHU, Capt S.S.
 SANGHA, Maj H.S.
 SANI, Capt K.S.
 SARAON, Capt K.A.
 SARIN, Maj R.P.
 SARMA, Vice Admiral S.H.
 SARPOIDAR, Maj S.P.
 SATNAM SINGH, Maj
 SATYAPAL SINGH, Maj
 SAWAN, Capt P.P.
 SAWILUVHIA, Capt H.
 SEKHON, Capt A.S.
 SENSARMA, Maj P.
 SETH, Maj K.K.
 SETH, Maj K.N.
 SETHI, Maj I.S.
 SHAHRAWAT, Capt R.S.
 SHANDIL, Maj R.N.
 SHARMA, Capt A.R.
 SHARMA, Maj A.S.
 SHARMA, Maj K.L.
 SHARMA, Flt Lt N.C.
 SHARMA, Maj N.L.
 SHARMA, Flt Lt R.
 SHARMA, Maj R.C.
 SHARMA, Maj S.K.
 SHARMA, Maj S.K.
 SHARMA, Maj S.S.
 SHUKLA, Fg Offr H.P.
 SIDHU, Maj K.S.
 SINHA, Flt Lt R.
 SINGH, Flt Lt D.V.

SINGH, Capt B.B.
 SINGH, Maj G.D.
 SINGH, Maj N.P.
 SINGH, Capt R.A.
 SINGH, Capt R.B.
 SINGH, Maj R.K.
 SINGH, Fg Offr R.K.
 SINGH, Capt S.V.P.
 SINGH, Lt V.J.
 SIROHI, Capt H.S.
 SIRSIKAR, Maj N.K.
 SODHA, Fg Offr Dilip
 SOKHEY, Flt Lt H.S.
 SOLANKI, Capt Mukand Singh
 SOMASHEKAR, Capt A.M.
 SOMASHEKHAR, Flt Lt B.G.
 SOOD, Maj Ajay
 SUHAG, Maj R.S.
 SUKHPAL SINGH, Capt
 SUMER SINGH, Maj
 SUNDER SINGH, Capt
 SUNNY, Capt K.A.
 SURESH CHANDRA, Capt
 SURINDER, Sqn Ldr M.S.

SURJIT SINGH, Maj
 TALWAR DEEPAK, Capt
 TALWAR, Capt R.B.
 THAKUR, Maj B.S.
 THOMAS, Capt K.
 THORAT, Capt D.D.P.
 THUMBY, Brig R.N.
 THUKRAL, Capt D.S.
 TEWARI, Capt D.K.
 TIWARI, Capt A.
 TIWARI, Capt P.C.
 VARMA, Fg Offr, C. K.
 VASDEV, Maj K.G.
 VED PRAKASH, 2/Lt (Life)
 VERMA, Capt J.P.
 VERMA, Capt Kuldip Singh
 VERMA, Maj N.S.
 VIDYARTHI, Flt Lt V.C.
 VIG, Maj P.
 VOHRA, Maj G.S.
 VYAS, Sqn Ldr K.C.
 WADEHRA, Maj R.N.
 WAGHMARE, Flt Lt A.V.
 WAHI, Maj R.M.

Twentyfive Officers mess and Institutions were enrolled as subscribers members, during this period.

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SECRETARY'S NOTES

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

Many members have not yet paid 1976 subscription, which became due on 1st January. If you have not paid yours, would you please do so without delay, and so save the Institution the cost of sending further reminders.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE JOURNAL

The USI Journal is in its 105th year of publication. As you will no doubt appreciate, the Institution spends a great deal of its funds on producing this publication. We would like to have your comments, criticism and suggestions so that we may improve this publication to meet your interests.

OLD BOOKS AND TROPHIES

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Delhi. The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of books, trophies, medals etc., presented to the Institution.

ADDRESSES

The difficulties of tracing addresses are now very much increased. Members are earnestly requested to keep the Secretary informed of changes in their addresses or if possible give a permanent address which will always find them e.g. a Bank.

LIBRARY BOOKS

There are many instances where members are keeping books for four or five months in spite of reminders. It would help the Librarian considerably if members ensure the return of books to the Library within one month of their receipt or immediately on their recall.

NEW MEMBERS

From 1 January 1976 to 31st March 1976, the following new members joined the Institution :—

ABRAHAM, Fg Offr P.U.

ADLAKHA, Capt A.K.

AHLAWAT, Flt Lt Y.S.

AHLUWALIA, Maj B.S.

AHLUWALIA, Maj S.S.

AJIT SINGH, Maj V.R.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- | | |
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| Brown, Seyom | New Forces in World Politics, 1971. |
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| Edwards, Michael | Playing the Great Game, 1975. |

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INDIA

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NATION REGAINS SPIRIT OF ADVENTURE 1975-76

Aid to Craftmen & Workers

- Rs. 47.2 million provided to clear accumulated stocks of handloom cloth.
- 13 intensive development projects and 20 export promotion centres taking shape to revitalise and develop handloom industry.
- Quality and availability of people's cloth improved. Retail outlets for supply since July 1975 increased to 46,694, 80 per cent of them in rural areas.
- Over 1,181 national permits issued for easier flow of essential commodities by road throughout the country.
- Shop councils and joint councils to enable workers, participation in industry, set up in over 617 undertakings, including 47 Central public sector concerns.

NATION ON THE MOVE


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